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The purpose of this study was to compare the performance of participants under three pay
systems when all were given five tiered goals. Seventy-one undergraduate students were
randomly assigned to receive either fixed pay, base pay with bonuses, or piece-rate pay. Over the
course of six 45-minute sessions, one of which served as a covariate, participants engaged in a
computerized simulated medical record data entry task. The primary dependent variable was the
average number of correctly completed medical records per session. An increasing relationship
was expected to be found between the three groups with respect to the number of correctly
completed records, with the fixed pay group performing the worst and the piece-rate pay group
performing the best. The results of a rank-based ANCOVA monotone analysis were inconsistent
with this hypothesis. A one-factor ANCOVA showed that, while the fixed pay group performed
significantly worse than both the base pay with bonuses group and the piece-rate pay group, the
latter two groups were not significantly different from one another. These results partially
replicated those of Ramos (2020), in which piece-rate pay with tiered goals outperformed fixed
pay with tiered goals. The results also indicated that base pay with bonuses, when paired with
tiered goals, may result in performance on par (or perhaps even better) than those of piece-rate
pay with tiered goals. Finally, a comparison was made between task performance in a laboratory
setting (Ramos, 2020) and in a remote setting (this study), finding that the latter resulted in

significantly lower performance for both fixed pay with tiered goals and piece-rate pay with
tiered goals. However, there were some methodological differences between the two studies
which present some confounds that will require further research to truly make the comparison.
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INTRODUCTION
The mechanism behind the effectiveness of goal setting has been theorized by numerous
researchers, all of whom have dissected it under their own disciplinary lens (Bandura, 1978;
Fellner & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1984; Locke & Latham, 2013b). Despite the range of analyses, it has
been consistently shown that goals which are specific, challenging, and achievable result in
higher levels of performance (Daniels & Bailey, 2014; Fellner & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1984; Jackson
& Zedeck, 1982; Lee at al., 1997; Locke & Latham, 2007; Steers & Porter, 1974). Add to this the
fact that goals are relatively simple to implement, and it is easy to see why goals are so
commonly used. In fact, goal setting has appeared in more than 1,000 studies over the more than
50 years that is has been used as a performance management procedure (Locke & Latham,
2013b). However, despite – or perhaps because of – its popularity and efficacy, managers may
not be setting goals for their employees in an optimal manner (Chow et al., 2001; Dickinson &
Gillette, 1994; Fisher et al., 2003). Notably, the greatest challenge that managers face when
setting goals is ensuring that all of their employees find those goals to be challenging and
achievable.
One possible solution to this is the use of tiered goals, which would allow for all
employees to have such a goal by ensuring that there exist differing goal levels, each of which is
more difficult than the previous. These differing goal levels, by nature of some being easier to
attain, would make it more likely that an employee receives reinforcement for their goalattaining behaviors and thus more likely that they would further engage in those behaviors and
reach higher goal levels. To this end, earlier applied research has used tiered goals within
package interventions to improve performance (Abernathy, 2001; Eikenhout & Austin, 2005;
Szabo et al., 2012). Further, previous laboratory research isolated the effects of tiered goals,
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showing them to be effective on their own as well as when paired with piece-rate pay (Ramos,
2020). This study aimed to extend those findings by comparing three different pay conditions
while participants are given tiered goals.
Behavioral Functions of Goals
Analyses aimed at determining the most impactful goal characteristics are rarely
conducted in organizational behavior management (OBM), despite numerous controlled
experiments conducted by researchers in both the industrial/organizational (I/O) psychology and
management fields. However, there are a number of theories regarding how goals and goal
setting serve their behavioral functions.
Fellner and Sulzer-Azaroff (1984) were among the first to conduct a behavioral analysis
of goals. They determined that goals serve as antecedent stimuli: If goals are correlated with the
availability of reinforcement for meeting that goal, then they operate as discriminative stimuli
(SDs). As such, goals can evoke goal-directed behavior, which is in turn maintained by the
reinforcement for having met that goal. It follows from this that then attaining the goal could
become a conditioned reinforcer, so long as goal attainment is repeatedly followed by other
reinforcers such as praise or monetary incentives. Furthermore, “… if meeting the goal is paired
frequently with a positive consequence or removal of a negative stimulus, the goal [italics added]
can function as a conditioned reinforcer” (p. 35). Fellner and Sulzer-Azaroff, however, do state
that because a goal usually precedes the desired work behavior, it more likely functions as an
antecedent that evokes those behaviors, and goal attainment (along with its rewards) functions as
reinforcement.
While agreeing that goals can function as discriminative stimuli, Agnew (1998)
maintained that they oftentimes function as motivating operations (Michael, 2004; Michael &
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Miguel, 2020). Agnew’s reasoning for this was that in work settings, because reinforcement for
performance is typically available regardless of whether there is a goal set for that performance,
this violates the definition of a discriminative stimulus. For example, if a worker is performing at
a high level, their manager is likely to praise them for that performance whether a goal has been
set or not. Additionally, goals also do two things: 1) they make stimuli related to that goal (e.g.,
the sight of a completed widget) more reinforcing and 2) they evoke work behavior aimed at
meeting that goal. The latter is the result of a reinforcement history in which meeting a goal has
been paired with immediate (e.g., praise) and delayed rewards (e.g., pay raises, promotions, etc.).
Arguing from a molecular perspective, however, temporal remoteness may be an issue.
Although it may not always be the case, goals oftentimes do not meet the immediacy
requirements to be considered discriminative stimuli. To truly function as one, the goal would
immediately have to evoke behavior (Malott, 1993; Michael, 2004; Michael & Miguel, 2020).
Similarly, the behavior evoked by that goal would have to be immediately followed by both a
reinforcer and the stimuli which indicate goal attainment. Of course, in an organizational setting,
this is particularly problematic because goals are typically based on work accomplishments (e.g.,
number of widgets assembled) rather than behaviors (e.g., the assembly of a widget). Following
these shortcomings, goal statements have instead been conceptualized as rules that establish a
relationship between a given set of behaviors and its consequences. Thus, goals evoke behaviors
aimed at meeting those goals by way of some sort of verbal mediation (Ludwig & Geller, 2000).
Schlinger & Blakeley (1987) referred to rules as contingency-specifying stimuli (rather
than discriminative stimuli). They indicated that rules could have a number of impacts on how
the other stimuli in the environment function. For example, if a manager sets a goal for her
employees (e.g., “You will receive X dollars if you produce Y widgets to meet goal Z”), that
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statement would make stimuli related to that goal (e.g., the sight of the written goal or a goal line
on a graph) no longer function as neutral stimuli. Rather, they would function as motivating
operations or discriminative stimuli. Although the goal itself may not immediately evoke
behavior, it does have function-altering properties. As such, the goal-related stimuli would then
immediately evoke behavior when presented. Additionally, because the individual has been
rewarded for attaining the goal, goal attainment (as well as stimuli related to progress toward the
goal) could become a conditioned reinforcer.
Malott (1993) expanded on this to state that the manager’s statement would likely evoke
a rule stated by the individual, such as, “If I don’t meet the goal, I will be criticized by my
manager and lose money.” Of course, criticism and loss of money are too delayed and therefore
cannot directly impact goal-directed behavior (and are thus considered analogs to negative
reinforcement). However, the self-statement functions as a conditioned reflexive motivating
operation (Michael, 2004; Michael & Miguel, 2020) by instead making rule noncompliance (e.g.,
engaging in non-goal-directed behaviors) aversive. This then evokes goal-directed behavior,
which, in turn, is followed by a decrease in the aversiveness caused by noncompliance (i.e.,
reinforcement). These behaviors will then continue to be evoked, further decreasing the aversive
condition of noncompliance, until the goal is met and the self-statement is no longer valid
(terminating the aversive condition). It is also worth noting that, although this is the overall
process, the degree of aversiveness will vary between individuals due to idiosyncratic learning
histories and so the timing of the goal-directed behavior will vary.
O’Hora and Maglieri (2006) analyzed goals from a different perspective of verbal
mediation. They used relational frame theory (Hayes et al., 2001) to showcase that statements
indicating a goal may evoke self-statements by the performer about their proximity to reaching
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that goal (i.e., the discrepancy between their current performance and the goal). For example, as
a performer creates widgets, they might say, “I have made one widget, which is 19 less than the
goal; I have made two widgets, which is 18 less than the goal” and so on, until they reach the
goal. As their performance nears that goal, their goal-directed behavior is reinforced by each of
those self-statements. Bandura (1978) maintained a similar position through his social learning
theory. He posited that the motivator for increasing performance is the difference between the
current performance and the goal, identified through feedback.
In agreement with this, Locke (1986) revised his original goal-setting theory to indicate
that for goals to have a motivating effect, goals and information about current performance (i.e.,
feedback) are necessary. This has been consistently supported by research (Amigo et al., 2008;
Bandura & Cervone, 1983; Erez, 1977; Locke et al., 1981; Reber & Wallin, 1984). Erez (1977)
used a number comparison task to compare performance when participants were given goals
alone or goals with feedback. She found that for goals to improve performance, feedback was
necessary. Differing from Erez, the findings of Bandura and Cervone (1983) showed that goals
alone increased performance, and that performance more than doubled when feedback was
added. These findings, along with others that further showcase how feedback allows performers
to compare their current performance to the goal (Chhokar & Wallin, 1984; Fellner & SulzerAzaroff, 1984), support the aforementioned conceptual analyses which indicate that the
discrepancy between current and goal performance (rather than the goal statement itself) is the
important factor for goal-directed behavior.
It is worth noting, however, that if the discrepancy is excessive, it may not evoke goaldirected behavior. Both traditional goal-setting theorists and behavior analysts alike stress that
goals must be challenging yet achievable if they are to improve performance (Daniels & Bailey,
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2014; Fellner & Sulzer-Azaroff, 1984; Lee at al., 1997; Locke & Latham, 2007). Unfortunately,
this is difficult to do (Daniels & Bailey, 2014), especially when goals are being set for a group
because a goal that may be easy for some may be difficult for others. Despite this knowledge,
neither traditional goal-setting theorists nor behavior analysts have investigated the best level of
difficulty for goals. While the traditional group defines challenging yet achievable goals as ones
which 20-50% of performers can achieve (Fatseas & Hirst, 1992; Jeffrey et al., 2012; Merchant
& Manzoni, 1989), the behavioral perspective would balk at this as it means that 50-80% of
performers would not meet the goals (and therefore not contact reinforcement for goal
attainment). As such, the debate on the best way to set goals continues (Locke & Latham,
2013a).
Goal-Setting Strategies
Stretch Goals
Stretch goals, which are typically set so that approximately 10% of employees can
achieve them (Daniels, 2009; Jeffrey et al., 2012), are commonly used in businesses due to the
successes reported by companies such as Toyota, GE, and Goldman Sachs (Kerr & Landauer,
2004; Kerr & LePelley, 2013). It is worth noting, however, that the successful implementation of
these goals is likely a result of complex social support as much as the numbers themselves.
Regardless, while stretch goals are intended to motivate employees to achieve performance
levels that they previously thought were impossible, the benefits of stretch goals are mostly
based on anecdotal, uncontrolled reports (Daniels, 2009; Sitkin et al., 2011). As such, the
variability of their implementations does not readily lend themselves to simple analysis. Further,
the studies that have analyzed the use of stretch goals find that they have detrimental effects on
performance (Chow et al., 2001; Fisher et al., 2003).

6

As mentioned previously, both behavior analysts and traditional goal-setting theorists
express that goals set at too high of a level can be problematic for performance. From a
behavioral perspective, this is explained as the result of a lack of reinforcement for (and the
resulting extinction of) responses evoked by those stretch goals (Daniels & Bailey, 2014; Fellner
& Sulzer-Azaroff, 1984; O’Hora & Maglieri, 2006). Even without criticism from a supervisor,
failing to meet a goal may automatically punish goal-directed behavior because of the
performer’s history, in which their performance was punished if it was inadequate. Locke and
Latham (1984), the leading goal-setting theorists in traditional psychology, stated that:
Nothing breeds success like success. Conversely, nothing causes feelings of despair like
perpetual failure. A primary purpose of goal-setting is to increase the motivation level of
the individual. But goal-setting can have precisely the opposite effect if it produces a
yardstick that constantly makes the individual inadequate. (p. 39)
Daniels and Bailey (2014), from a behavioral perspective, stated similarly: “Repeated failure or
repeated exposure to aversive consequences despite continued efforts, leads to learned
helplessness” (p. 245).
One experimental example of the aforementioned comes from Roose and Williams
(2017), who showed that very difficult goals can result in detrimental effects on performance. In
their study, they used 24 undergraduate students who were randomly assigned to either a “do
your best” (control) condition or to one of two goal conditions, each with a different goal level.
In one of these goal conditions, the goal was set at 150% of the participant’s own baseline level;
in the other, the goal was set at 175% of baseline. Throughout the experiment, participants
performed a task that simulated the job of a medical data entry clerk. Participants also received
both in-session and post-session feedback regarding the quantity of correct and incorrect
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responses they made. All participants underwent one baseline and three experimental sessions,
all of which lasted 13 minutes each. The results unequivocally showed that the 150% group
performed significantly higher than the other two groups. In the 150% group, seven of the eight
participants met their goal by the end of the study, compared to only one of the participants in
the 175% group. Furthermore, in the 175% group, two other worrisome events occurred: (a) only
about one-third of the participants increased their performance across goal sessions and (b)
accuracy, on average, not only decreased across those goal sessions but it was significantly less
than accuracy in the other two groups. These results show that, despite the anecdotal,
uncontrolled reports made by companies, goals that are too difficult may indeed negatively
impact performance over time (perhaps due to repeated failures to meet the goal).
Successively Increasing Goals
In an effort to avoid the pitfalls of stretch goals – namely performers not reaching the
goal and thus not attaining reinforcement for their goal-oriented behaviors – some behavioral
researchers have adapted a changing criterion design framework (Bateman & Ludwig, 2003;
Ludwig & Geller, 2000; Sulzer-Azaroff et al., 1990; Wilk & Redmon, 1990, 1997). According to
Klein et al., (2017) a changing criterion design “utilizes step-wise benchmarks for manipulating
… a single behavior already present in an individual’s repertoire,” particularly where “an
immediate considerable increase or decrease may be difficult to achieve or undesired; therefore,
gradual shifts toward a desired goal are applied” (p. 1). Thus, where goal setting is concerned, a
changing criterion design would involve, at first, setting an easily-attainable goal and then
progressing the difficulty of that goal over time until the terminal goal is reached. Through the
use of this methodology, goal-oriented behaviors may increase, which consequently might make
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them more likely to attain each subsequent goal (Bateman & Ludwig, 2003). Daniels (2009)
elaborated on this:
By rewarding goal attainment you increase motivation and achieve subsequent goals.
While small incremental goals appear to take longer to produce significant results, the
opposite is true. This is because positive reinforcement accelerates performance and
small goals provide more opportunities for acceleration. (p. 42)
Sulzer-Azaroff et al. (1990) leveraged this concept in their study set in a manufacturing
environment. A packaged intervention (goals, feedback, praise, and nonmonetary incentives) was
used to improve safety behaviors across three departments with a total of 225 employees. They
employed a multiple-baseline design in which feedback and incentives were held constant during
the intervention phases. What changed, however, were the goal levels, which increased in
difficulty either five times (Departments 1 and 2) or six times (Department 3) over the 24-week
duration of the study. As the goal difficulty increased, so too did safety achievements across all
three departments – from an average of 70% during baseline to approximately 96% at the end of
the intervention phase. Similarly, the number of OSHA recordables and lost-time accidents
dropped respectively, from 47 to 20 and from 14 to one.
Bateman and Ludwig (2003) carried out a similar study, this time in a food distribution
warehouse, focused on reducing the number of errors made by 23 employees when filling orders.
In this instance, their package intervention consisted of feedback, monetary incentives, and
successively decreasing goals (which were successively more difficult due to reducing the
number of errors). Like Sulzer-Azaroff et al. (1990), they held feedback and incentives constant
during the intervention. However, they differed from the earlier research in that a control group
was used. For the experimental group, goals were decreased (made more difficult) every other
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week for 13 weeks (a total of six times). During the study, no decrease in errors was seen in the
control group, but the experimental group’s errors decreased from 0.316% during baseline to
0.208% in the final phase of the intervention.
Despite the successes witnessed with these two studies, it is worth noting that the practice
of increasing goals without increasing rewards can be risky. These studies were successful
perhaps due to the sophistication of the researchers with behavior analysis. Sulzer-Azaroff et al.
(1990) and Bateman and Ludwig (2003) were likely aware of the potential punishing effects of
increasing goals without similarly increasing the rewards, indicated by the precautions they took
to mitigate those effects. Sulzer-Azaroff et al. ensured that performance stabilized for about a
month after meeting each sub-goal before continuing to the next goal level (as well as ensuring
that supervisors provided positive weekly feedback and major celebrations each month that
significant achievements were made). Bateman and Ludwig informed employees at the start of
the study that goals would become more challenging every other week until the final goal was
met.
However, these two quintessential examples are not always the case, particularly in
industry. As Dickinson and Gillette (1994) have noted, once goals have increased a few times,
employees may engage in an effort to prevent management from continuing to set even higher
goals by restricting (or perhaps even decreasing) their performance. An excellent example of this
can be seen in the behavioral analysis carried out by Parsons (1974) on the results of the
Hawthorne studies. In his analysis, Parsons noted that employees in the Bank Wiring Room
consistently performed below the goal set by management, despite receiving piece-rate pay. It
turned out that employees forewent the performance standards set by management in exchange
for one they set themselves in an effort to ensure a constant income. In interviews with
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employees, it was revealed that they “thought that, if any excessive amount of work were turned
out, the management would lower the piecework rate and the employees would therefore be in
the position of doing more work for approximately the same pay” (p. 927). To this end, if any
employee performed above or below the standard set by the group (not management), they were
ostracized, sworn at, and, in some cases, physically punished by their peers. Of course, these
practices would be considered barbaric today – but they do serve to showcase the problems that
can arise from successively increasing goals without also increasing rewards. A similar argument
has repeatedly been made by experts in the fields of compensation and management (Lawler,
1990; Lincoln, 1946; Snell & Bohlander, 2012).
Tiered Goals
Although researchers and organizations can sidestep the issues that arise when terminal
goals are set too high by instead using successively increasing goals, doing so may result in
different punishing effects. To combat this, the idea of tiered goals, in which multiple goals are
presented concurrently (rather than successively), may provide an alternative without the
downsides. In fact, Locke (2004) suggested this method (providing higher bonuses for meeting
each higher-level goal), especially when goals are paired with monetary incentives. He posited
that this would likely be effective because “Highly competent employees who just miss a highlevel goal still get rewarded” (p. 131). By having the multiple goals and their corresponding
rewards available at the onset, tiered goals eliminate the possibility of higher levels of
performance resulting in higher goals for the same rewards, thereby resolving the concerns with
successively increasing goals. Instead, with tiered goals, the goals are constant from the
beginning, and employees can receive more rewards by improving their performance to meet
each of the higher goals.
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In OBM, tiered goals have their place in industry, stemming from the Organizational
Matrix (Riggs, 1986). This then evolved to become the Performance Scorecard (Abernathy,
1996) and the Performance Matrix (Daniels & Bailey, 2014). Both of these tools are used for
managing performance and do so by providing performers with up to ten goal levels for a given
behavior/result. The tools can be, and often are, used to target several different behaviors/results,
with higher levels of performance being associated with differential rewards. However, these
tools have commonly been used as part of a successful package intervention (Abernathy, 2001;
Eikenhout & Austin, 2005; Szabo et al., 2012), and so the tools (and therefore the tiered goals)
have never been experimentally isolated.
Despite the lack of experimental isolation, the effects of the tiered goals when combined
with additional interventions are worth examining. In Szabo et al. (2012), researchers in a human
services setting measured the performance of a clinical service review team (CSRT) through use
of a scorecard. The scorecard was based on and implemented at the same time as a yes/no
checklist for overseeing the completion of critical performances of nine supervisory teams (STs).
The STs met every other week and the CSRT met monthly to review the decisions made by those
STs. If the CSRT met or exceeded their performance criterion, which was set at 1000 points, for
two consecutive months, they earned a pizza party.
During the three-month baseline, the CSRT averaged 672 points. For the three months
following the introduction of the scorecard, scores were just below the criterion, but then
exceeded it for the next six months and afterward, at three-, six-, and twelve-month probes.
Improvements in ST performance and consumer outcomes were also present during these
periods. It is worth noting, however, that during the follow-up, the CSRT did not use scorecards
consistently but rather “periodically.” Regardless, the authors determined that the need for
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expensive organizational rewards may be reduced by using performance scorecards that link
direct report and consumer performances.
Eikenhout and Austin (2005) used a within-group ABAC design in a large department
store to evaluate the efficacy of a package intervention at improving customer service. That
package consisted of a performance matrix, goals, feedback, and praise. There were three groups,
one being cashiers (N=45) and the other two being sales associates in two different departments
(N=35 in each). During baseline, researchers covertly measured either four or five customer
service behaviors made by the cashers or sales associates, respectively. In the B condition, line
graphs were publicly posted, by group, showing the percentage of time that each behavior was
observed. These were updated three times each week. After a return to baseline, in the C
condition, employees were given the package intervention. As part of that package, the
performance matrix had tiered goals for each of the customer service behaviors, as well as a
combined overall score based on weights given to reflect the importance of each behavior. In this
condition, while the same graphs from the B condition were again publicly posted, they also
included a goal that was based on a score for the overall performance matrix, as well as positive
comments left by supervisors at least weekly. During the first week of the C condition, the
graphs showed a subgoal, which was replaced by the terminal goal for the second and third
weeks. During those three weeks, supervisors also held weekly team meetings during which they
met with employees and gave feedback on each of the behaviors, as well as congratulations on
goal attainment or improvements toward such. Supervisors also walked through the areas at least
three times per day, immediately praising any instance of customer service behaviors they
witnessed. Finally, if employees met the performance matrix goal for a consecutive two weeks,
they were promised a celebration party.
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The interventions were successful at increasing customer service behaviors, although
results were comparable between the B and C conditions. In the A, B, A, and C conditions,
cashiers had an average occurrence of 36%, 84%, 42%, and 83%, respectively, across all four
behaviors. The sales associates saw similar increases, with the averages across both departments
and all five behaviors being 7.5%, 54%, 14.5%, and 58%, respectively. The comparable
performances between the B and C conditions were likely due to the fact that employees in all of
the groups met all but one of the behavior terminal goals for the performance matrices during the
feedback condition. And, as there was no additional reward for performing above those goals
during the package intervention condition, performance likely plateaued as a result.
Abernathy (2001) performed the most extensive evaluation of scorecards to date, by
retrospectively examining their effects, when paired with monetary incentive programs in twelve
organizations. This included organizations in banking, retail, manufacturing, publishing, and
distribution. In each, scorecards were given to employees and completed monthly. On those
scorecards, employees received measure-specific and overall performance scores, as well as the
amount of money they earned in incentives for that month. To perform the aggregate analysis,
Abernathy created one index per organization by combining all of its scorecard measures. Then,
Abernathy plotted the index from each organization for the first year of its implementation.
Although results varied across organizations, the average improvement during that first year was
33.12%.
The studies carried out by Szabo et al. (2012), Eikenhout and Austin (2005), and
Abernathy (2001) collectively lend support to the idea of using tiered goals in a business setting
to improve the performance of employees. By using performance scorecards and matrices, all of
which inherently leverage tiered goals, performances unequivocally improved across all three
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studies. In addition to these aforementioned employee management programs, there also exists
the use of similar programs aimed at increasing customer spending and loyalty. Examples like
the M Life Rewards by MGM Resorts International (“M Life Rewards Benefits Chart,” 2021)
and the EDGE Program by EB Games (“EDGE Program Benefits Chart,” 2021) both of which
grant points to customers based on their patronage, ultimately allowing those customers to earn
more desirable perks and benefits.
Lastly, Jeffrey et al. (2012), although it did not directly examine tiered goals, did provide
support for their use. In that study, researchers randomly assigned performers to either a “one
goal for all” condition, in which every performer had the same goal, or a performance-based goal
condition, in which goal levels were based on the performance of that individual. Two preexperimental sessions, in which performers were paid piece-rate pay, served to determine the
performance level of each performer. They were then classified as either low, medium, or high
performers. In the “one goal for all” condition, the goal was set so that 20% of the performers
would meet it. In the performance-based goal condition, the goals were similarly set so that 20%
of the performers would meet them, but the goals were specific to each sub-group (low, medium,
or high performers). All of the performers then underwent three 35-minute sessions and, in
addition to within- and post-session feedback, were also given a base pay with a bonus for
meeting the goal they were assigned. In the “one goal for all” condition, performers received
$5.00 if they met the goal. In the performance-based goal condition, they received either $3.50,
$4.25, or $5.00 depending on whether they were in the low, medium, or high performer group.
Regardless of which condition they were in, the performances of high performers were
comparable to one another. Low performers, on the other hand, did significantly better in the
low-performance sub-group when compared to low performers in the “one goal for all”
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condition. Additionally, when compared to their counterparts in the “one goal for all” group,
more performers met their goal in the low- and medium-performance sub-groups. These results
show that a performance-based goal benefitted low performers because they were more likely to
meet the goal (and receive the bonus) when compared to those in the “one goal for all” condition.
It is also worth noting that performers in both the low- and medium-performance sub-groups
decreased their performances over the three sessions, something which aligns with the findings
of Roose and Williams (2017) and suggests that the repeated lack of reinforcement over those
sessions may have extinguished goal-directed behavior.
Unfortunately, the grouping of performers based on their performance level, as in Jeffrey
et al. (2012), could not be used in business because of the disparity in pay between groups
(which would violate wage laws at both the state and federal levels, not to mention that it would
also likely be rejected by employees due to its unfairness). This grouping does, however, lend
credence to the idea that tiered goals (which would provide performers with an easily attainable
goal as well as consecutively more difficult goals) may result in better performance across all
performers. Because low performers would be more likely to attain the easiest goal, their goaldirected behaviors would be more readily reinforced, ultimately making them more likely to
continue engaging in those goal-directed behaviors in the future (and hopefully shaping their
behavior enough for them become high performers). For high performers, the presence of the
highest goal would continue to provide a challenging yet attainable goal that continues to
reinforce their goal-directed behavior.
Wage Pay
The Bureau of Labor Statistics (2021b) defines productivity as a quantity of goods
produced or services provided per hour worked. Since 1948, productivity in the U.S. has risen at
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an average annual rate of 2.17%, whereas hourly compensation has risen at an average annual
rate of 4.99% (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2021a). This effectively means that, every year,
organizations pay their employees more without receiving commensurate performance from
those employees. At the heart of this are likely two factors: (a) where the productivity of workers
is concerned, it is well-documented that paying workers a fixed wage results in
underperformance when compared to monetary incentive pay (Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001) and
(b) in the fourth quarter of 2020, the majority of Americans received salary or hourly wages
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2021c). As such, this should be of great concern to organizations
because their success relies both upon the performance of their individual employees (Lawler,
1990) and upon providing goods or services at a competitive cost, which can be difficult to
achieve if productivity continually dwindles behind costs.
However, it is easy to understand why organizations continue to use wage pay with their
employees, despite warnings to the contrary. From the viewpoint of an organization, wage pay is
preferred due to its relative ease of designing, budgeting, and administering pay (Dierks &
McNally, 1987; Frisch & Dickinson, 1990). Similarly, when compared to incentive systems,
wage pay provides employees with a certain financial stability in that it guarantees a fixed
amount of money for their labor. Where wage pay requires only that an organization track the
hours worked by employees and the pay they receive for those hours, an incentive system is
significantly more cumbersome. For an incentive system, the organization must first determine
how to measure the performance of employees – and do this for each type of job, team, unit, or
division within that organization. Then, the organization must determine how to calculate payout
(both quantity and frequency) for meeting those performance measures. Furthermore, because it
may not be feasible for an organization to create incentive systems for all of its job roles
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(particularly where the measurement of performance may be hindered by the nature of the work),
dividing the work force into those who do and do not receive incentive pay may be concerning to
organizational leaders (Dickinson & Gillette, 1994).
Incentive Systems and Goals
Piece-Rate Pay and Goals
Although the majority of Americans receive wage pay, it has consistently been shown
that incentive systems, where pay is contingent on performance, are more effective (Bonner et
al., 2000; Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001; Condly et al., 2003; Garbers & Konradt, 2014; Jenkins et
al., 1998; Stajkovic & Luthans, 2003). Reviews of both laboratory and field studies, performed
by Jenkins et al. (1998) and Garbers and Konradt (2014), showed that incentive systems resulted
in performance increases averaging an effect size of 0.34 and 0.32, respectively. When the
analysis is restricted to business organizations, as in Stajkovic and Luthans (2003), the average
effect size is even larger, at 0.68 (corresponding to a 23% improvement). It is worth noting that
these authors also found performance increased substantially more when incentives were used
alone than when social recognition or feedback were used alone. Moreover, when researchers
used conservative measures to compare no-pay control groups to hourly pay groups, hourly pay
did not result in better performances (Bonner et al., 2000). If liberal measures are used, hourly
pay was better in only 33% of the studies.
Of particular note are piece-rate incentive systems, which have been shown to have very
strong effects on performance (Dierks & McNally, 1987; Gaetani et al., 1985; LaMere et al.,
1996; Lazear, 2000). For example, in a study conducted by Gaetani et al. (1985), two machine
shop workers received a weekly 5% commission when the number of dollars they charged
customers exceeded a standard. When compared to baseline, the number of dollars billed by
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those workers increased, on average, by more than 190% after the implementation of the
commission – without any adverse impact on quality.
In another study, conducted by Lazear (2000) in a large glass manufacturing
organization, a piece-rate pay system was implemented for nearly 3,000 workers. After the
introduction of that piece-rate pay system and throughout the 19-month duration of the study,
productivity increased by 44% – and quality, customer satisfaction, and company profitability all
increased, as well.
In one of the longest field studies, LaMere et al. (1996) worked with a waste disposal
organization to implement a piece-rate pay system for 22 of their truck drivers. When truck
drivers were able to earn incentives in the form of 3% of their total wages, they immediately
increased their performance by about 20% from baseline. Interestingly, when the incentive was
increased to 6% and 9%, performance did not increase beyond the original 3%. Regardless,
performance increases maintained for nearly four years, until the researchers ceased data
collection. Over these four years, the organization saved an average of $5,000 per month in
labor, despite an increase in pay for the drivers. It should also be noted that this increase in
performance had no impact on safety as it was equivalent during both baseline and intervention.
LaMere et al. (1996) shows that piece-rate pay systems can be effective if they take the
form of only a portion of an employee’s pay, rather than all of it, being contingent on
performance. Frisch and Dickinson (1990) also found an increase in performance with incentives
being only 10% of performer base pay. Finally, Dickinson and Gillette (1994) found that the
effects are comparable whether performers are paid only a portion in incentives or they are paid
entirely in incentives. This fact may assuage any concerns regarding financial security, as
workers would be guaranteed at least a base wage with the former (Aamodt, 2016).
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There were also three initial studies that examined the effects hourly pay, goals, and
piece-rate pay had on performance (Chung & Vickery, 1976; Pritchard & Curtis, 1973; Terborg
& Miller, 1978). Terborg and Miller (1978) found that participants assembled significantly more
toy models when piece-rate pay was combined with goals, compared to either hourly pay, hourly
pay with goals, or piece-rate pay alone. Based on a regression analysis, they also showed that
goals and piece-rate pay had independent and compounding performance effects. Chung and
Vickery (1976) and Pritchard and Curtis (1973) showed similar results in their studies, finding
that performance could be expected to increase with both goals and piece-rate pay when
compared to hourly pay.
Ramos (2020) found similar effects with tiered goals and piece-rate pay. The study used
104 undergraduates participating in five 45-minute experimental sessions, during which they
engaged in a simulated medical data record entry task. Prior to the experimental session, all
participants underwent a 45-minute pre-experimental session (during which they were paid
piece-rate pay) to serve as the covariate. Feedback was provided in the form of in-session
feedback, displayed by the program, if participants chose to view it, and as receipts given to the
participants by the researcher prior to the start of the session (which showed number of correctly
completed records for the previous session, as well as pay earned). Participants were randomly
assigned to one of the four following conditions: hourly pay without tiered goals, hourly pay
with tiered goals, piece-rate pay without tiered goals, or piece-rate pay with tiered goals. The
receipts for the participants in the two tiered goals groups also displayed the five tiered goals,
which corresponded to the 10th, 30th, 50th, 70th, and 90th percentiles of performance.
The adjusted group averages showed unequivocally that the piece-rate pay with tiered
goals group correctly completed significantly more medical records than the other three groups.
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The analysis also showed that the hourly pay with tiered goals group significantly outperformed
the hourly pay without tiered goals group. Thus, these findings align with those of the three
earlier studies in indicating that goals and piece-rate pay have independent and compounding
performance effects.
Bonus Pay and Goals
While bonuses are common incentives in organizations, their characteristics can vary.
Namely, bonuses may vary in whether they are contingent on performance (as opposed to, for
example, a holiday bonus); whether they are contingent on the individual’s performance, as
opposed to a group’s or the organization’s (e.g., profit sharing); and the frequency at which the
bonus is paid (e.g., quarterly or yearly). Unfortunately, because of these variations in “bonus”
types, the exact proportion of employees receiving individualized bonus incentives is not clear.
Furthermore, neither are the performance standards and other details of those incentive systems.
What is clear from the research, however, is that performance-contingent bonuses and
goals have interactive effects on performance (Lee et al., 1997; Mowen et al., 1981). Mowen et
al. (1981) used a 2 x 3 between-group design to compare the effects of types of incentive systems
and goal difficulty levels. The incentive systems were piece-rate pay and base pay plus a bonus
that was contingent upon goal attainment. The goal levels were based on a pilot study and set as
follows: very easy (100% of participants expected to reach it), moderate (50% expected to reach
it); very difficult (0% expected to reach it). One hundred and twenty-four undergraduates were
randomly assigned to one of the six conditions and were paid with poker chips for completing
arithmetic problems (adding columns of four six-digit numbers). The poker chips could later be
exchanged for small office supplies. The piece-rate pay groups were given one poker chip for
each correctly completed arithmetic problem, regardless of whether they attained their assigned
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goal. The bonus pay groups received 15 chips as their base, with an additional 15 for the
participants in the “very easy” goal group if they met their goal, 40 for the “moderate” goal
group, and 90 for the “very difficult” goal group. To ensure equality between the piece-rate and
bonus groups, participants in the bonus groups also earned piece-rate for any correctly completed
problems above their goal. Finally, participants were also given a posttest to determine whether
office supplies were a desirable form of payment, as well as to ensure that participants
understood their pay system and whether they thought they could reach their assigned goal.
The authors used the participants’ perceived ability to reach their assigned goal, as well
as their actual ability and accuracy (both measured during a five-minute practice session) as the
covariates to control for any pre-existing differences between participants. The analyses showed
that under the “very easy” and “moderate” goal conditions, the bonus groups outperformed the
piece-rate pay groups. However, the piece-rate pay with the “very difficult” goal group correctly
completed the most arithmetic problems out of all the conditions. Perhaps unsurprisingly, of the
three bonus pay groups, the “very difficult” goal group performed the worst. This is consistent
with the argument made by Daniels (2009) that, “… the best mistake in setting a goal is to set it
too low” (p. 41). However, it should be noted that the “very difficult” goal in this study went
beyond even a stretch goal (0% of participants were expected to reach it), which goes against the
suggestion that a goal should be difficult yet achievable (Lee et al., 1997; Locke & Latham,
2007).
Miller and Steele (1984) attempted to replicate the study by Mowen et al. (1981) but
found no interaction effect. Lee et al. (1997), in their extension of Mowen et al. noted that this
was likely due to Miller and Steele not providing subjects with performance feedback, whereas
Mowen et al. did. So, Lee et al. extended the original study, this time using a 3 x 3 between-
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groups design, providing feedback on performance, and paying participants $9 on average. In
their study, the pay systems were hourly wage, piece-rate pay, and bonus pay; and the goal
difficulties, again based on a pilot study, were set at 90%, 50%, and 10%. The dependent
variable was the same as the original but divided into two trials. Additionally, only the practice
session performance was used as a covariate (as opposed to the posttest measures that were also
used in the original).
With 102 undergraduates, Lee et al. (1997) first had participants undergo a 5-minute
practice session before assigning them their goal. Then participants performed the task for ten
minutes, after which they graded themselves using answers provided by the researcher.
Following this, participants were then assigned a higher goal (that corresponded to the same
percentiles, but accounted for learning effects, again based on data from the pilot study) before
performing the task for another 10 minutes. In both trials, the analysis showed that the group
receiving bonus pay and the “very easy” goal correctly completed the fewest problems of all six
groups. Of all the three bonus groups, however, the “moderate” goal group was the highest
performing. When the authors examined the 2 (“moderate” and “very difficult” goals) x 2 (piecerate pay and bonus pay), they found similar results as Mowen et al. (1981) with respect to
performance.
Tiered Goals and Incentive Systems
Locke (2004) posited that a tiered goal system would likely result in different levels of
performance than would a single goal, particularly when investigating incentive systems. He
reasoned that the effectiveness of tiered goals would likely result from performers still being
rewarded, even if they just miss a high-level goal. Sundberg (2015) and Urschel (2015) agreed,
reasoning from a behavioral perspective that tiered goals would ensure that performers receive
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reinforcement at various levels of performance. This, in turn, would make it so that even
employees who cannot reach the highest goal will still have their goal-directed behavior
reinforced for reaching a lower-level goal. As a result of this, the reinforcement for meeting
those lower-level goals would likely then evoke higher levels of performance, perhaps to the
point of reaching the highest goal (Bateman & Ludwig, 2003; Daniels & Bailey, 2014).
With this reasoning in mind, Urschel (2015) examined three types of goals (moderate,
difficult, and tiered) under a base pay with bonuses incentive system. There were three tiered
goals, determined by previous research to be low, moderate, and difficult. In this study, 44
undergraduate students engaged in a simulated medical record data entry task for six 45-minute
sessions, throughout which they received printed receipts of their performance in the previous
session that included both a text form and a graphic form of their performance, as well as their
assigned goal(s). The first session was used as a covariate in the analyses, with participants being
paid straight base pay (no bonus). Analyses were conducted on the second and sixth sessions due
to the experimenter’s interest in the initial and terminal effects of the goals. Unfortunately,
Urschel found significant ceiling effects regardless of the goal type, which was determined to be
the result of the goals being too easy to attain. As such, no significant differences between goal
types were found.
Sundberg (2015) continued with this line of research by examining the effects of four pay
systems. In this study, all participants were given five tiered goals, determined from previous
research. The first, third, and fifth of these goals were intended to align with those of Lee et al.
(1997). Specifically, these goals were meant to be set such that 90%, 50%, and 10% of
performers would reach them. Sixty-six undergraduate students engaged in the same medical
record data entry task as in Urschel (2015), but this time for only five 45-minute sessions
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(however, the experimenters discarded the data from the last session due to abnormalities). Like
Urschel, participants also received graphic feedback on their previous session prior to the start of
a session. However, Sundberg also included vocal feedback before the sessions, as well as
computer-delivered feedback during the sessions. It should be noted that the vocal feedback was
purely objective in that researchers did not comment on performance, as it may have served as a
form of evaluative social reinforcement and consequently may have affected performance
(Derthick, 2018; Johnson, 2013).
The four pay systems were fixed pay, piece-rate pay, threshold piece-rate pay, and bonus
pay. In all but the fixed pay condition, participants earned a base pay with incentives based upon
on the number of correctly completed medical records. The threshold piece-rate pay condition
bears explanation in that it was similar to the piece-rate pay condition, but the per-piece incentive
increased as participants met higher goals (whereas the per-piece incentive was constant in the
piece-rate pay condition). In the bonus pay condition, the amount of the bonus increased only
when participants met the next, higher goal.
Unfortunately, Sundberg (2015) again found no significant differences on the number of
correctly completed medical records between the groups. Because of this, it could be the case
that fixed pay with tiered goals may result in similar performance as incentive pay with tiered
goals. If so, this would be contrary to the results of earlier research, which found separate and
additive effects caused by goals and piece-rate pay (Chung & Vickery, 1976; Pritchard & Curtis,
1973; Terborg & Miller, 1978). However, the lack of statistically significant differences in
Sundberg (2015) were determined to be due to sample sizes that were likely too small (as
indicated by very high within-group variability across all groups) and tiered goals that were set
too high (as indicated by a substantially smaller number of participants reaching each goal than
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was expected). Additionally, Sundberg noted that participants in the piece-rate pay group
performed highest of the four groups, although again not to a statistically significant level. Thus,
further research was warranted.
Ramos (2020), detailed previously, extended this line of research by examining fixed pay
and piece-rate pay conditions both with either no tiered goals or five tiered goals (which were
based on earlier research by Einarsson, 2016). The experimenters posited that the piece-rate pay
with tiered goals group would be the highest performing group, the fixed pay without tiered
goals group would be the lowest performing, and the fixed pay with tiered goals and piece-rate
pay without tiered goals groups would fall in the middle (because earlier research had not led the
experimenters to insight on which of these two groups would outperform the other). A rankbased monotone ANCOVA showed this ranking to be the case, and a comparison of the
percentiles of actual to expected performance (for the tiered goals) showed no discrepancy
greater than 6%. What is interesting, however, is an additional 2 x 2 ANCOVA with subsequent
Fisher-Hayter comparison tests run the by the experimenters, which showed that indeed there
was no statistically significant difference between the fixed pay with tiered goals group and
piece-rate pay without tiered goals group. In other words, tiered goals, when added to fixed pay,
may result in performance increases similar to that of piece-rate pay alone.
Summary and Rationale
The current study sought to extend the line of research on tiered goals, this time by
examining the effects of three types of pay systems (fixed pay, piece-rate pay, and bonus pay)
when performers were given the same five tiered goals. Based on the findings by Sundberg
(2015), we suspected that the piece-rate pay group would perform the highest. Earlier research,
including that of Ramos (2020), suggested that the fixed pay group would perform the worst.
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Because the current study was an extension of Ramos (2020), the experimental
procedures were similar. However, because of the effects of COVID-19, the experimental task
was performed remotely by participants rather than in a lab setting. As such, it was likely that the
actual number of participants who attained each of the tiered goals would differ and thus affect
the results. So, as a precaution, the experimenter compared early participant data from the
covariate session of this study to that from Ramos (2020). No significant disparities were
witnessed in these early stages, and so data collection continued as planned.
The performance of participants while working remotely was of particular interest in this
study as well. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2020), “… 24 percent of employed
persons did some or all of their work at home…” With the recent pandemic forcing many office
workers to work from home, these numbers have likely grown significantly. This means that a
large proportion of the population may find it challenging to keep their home life from
interrupting their work (Kniffin et al., 2021). Additionally, a Gartner (2020) survey showed that,
when compared to employees who never work remotely, those who do are more likely to exhibit
high discretionary effort. Contrarily, other survey data show that remote workers typically find,
“… the working day is longer, the intensity of each hour worked is higher and more voluntary
effort is expended” (Felstead & Henseke, 2017, p. 205).
Because of the ambiguous nature of the findings around remote work, it was hoped that
this study would add empirical evidence to the literature on the performance of remote workers
compared to their non-remote peers. This was done by comparing the performance of
participants in the fixed pay and piece-rate pay groups with those of Ramos (2020), which used
the same experimental methods but in a laboratory environment. Furthermore, it was hoped that
this study would contribute to the literature on tiered goals, perhaps shedding light on whether
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they are best used with piece-rate pay or with bonus pay. It was thought that piece-rate pay
would result in significantly higher performance, but a finding to the contrary could be beneficial
knowledge for organizations, as a bonus pay system is typically easier to implement and oversee
than that of a piece-rate pay system.
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METHOD
Participants
Prior to recruiting participants, the approval of Western Michigan University’s (WMU)
Human Subjects Internal Review Board (HSIRB) was sought with respect to conducting the
current study. The approval letter is provided in Appendix A. The recruitment script and
presentation used to recruit undergraduate students can be found in Appendix B. Due to the
limitations imposed by the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), students were recruited in
one of three ways: (a) in person, where the researcher read the recruitment script to a classroom
of students at the start of the class period; (b) online by the instructor, who posted the recruitment
presentation to the class website; and (c) online by e-mail communication, through which a
condensed version of the recruitment script was sent to groups of students.
Ninety undergraduate students enrolled at WMU were recruited to participate in the
study, although only 71 of those 90 completed the study. Potential participants who
communicated with the researcher were contacted via e-mail with the consent form, which
provides details of the research study (Appendix C). If students elected to participate, they filled
out a Qualtrics survey containing the consent statement and a short questionnaire to determine if
they were indeed eligible to participate in the study (Appendix D).
Students were eligible to participate in the research study if they met the following
criteria: (a) must not have participated in previous studies which used the same experimental
task; (b) must not have taken or be currently enrolled in PSY 3440 (Organizational Psychology),
PSY 2444 (Organizational Psychology), or PSY 3444 (Advanced OBM); (c) could meet the time
requirements for the study of six 45-minute sessions during the semester in which they began the
study, and within six weeks of beginning the study; and (d) had a computer available, on which
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they had installed Microsoft Excel (downloadable for free using their university account) and
Loom, a free video- and screen-recording software available through Google. This latter
requirement restricted participants to those with a computer with either Windows or Macintosh
operating systems, as other operating systems would not function with the Excel-based
experimental task.
Lastly, for their participation in the study, participants were able to earn extra credit
towards one of their classes, provided that the instructor allowed for that. Additionally,
participants were told they would be likely to earn, on average, $9.30 per 45-minute session, or
approximately $55.80 for the whole study. Due to the limitations imposed as a result of COVID19, participants could elect to be paid in cash or via Venmo, a secure mobile payment service
owned by PayPal, through which the researcher sent the participant their earnings.
Setting
Because of the impacts of COVID-19 and the recent rise of remote work environments,
all meetings and sessions occurred online. For the initial meeting, prospective participants
scheduled an online meeting with the researcher via e-mail. That first meeting, held virtually
over WebEx (software provided free for students by the university), served to orient and train
participants to the requirements of the study. However, after this first meeting and until the
debriefing meeting, all interactions between participant and researcher occurred via e-mail
(unless the participant explicitly asked for a one-on-one meeting). Twenty-four hours prior to
each of the participants’ scheduled sessions, the researcher e-mailed participants the task and
their pay and performance receipt for the previous session (beginning with the second session).
Any questions that participants had before their session could be e-mailed to the
researcher, who responded within 24 hours. During the session, participants were required to
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have Loom (a free video messaging software application) installed and running on their
computer. For the duration of the session, participants and their computer screens were recorded
by Loom. Once the session was over, participants closed out of Loom, which then provided them
with a weblink that they then sent to the researcher, allowing the researcher to view the session.
Participants were also required to set aside the time for the session, ensuring that they could be in
front of their computer for the full 45 minutes, without another person present in the room (or at
least be isolated, if they were in a public space such as a library).
To more realistically simulate a work environment in which a manager typically has
numerous employees, participants were told that their Loom recording may or may not be
viewed but was a requirement of their participation. However, when oddities were found with
their data, the video for that session was viewed. Participants who failed to record their first,
second, or third session – or otherwise provide that recording to the researcher – were removed
from the study. This was not the case if they failed to provide the recording of any of their last
three sessions, however, unless it occurred more than once. The researcher reviewed, on average
and at random, one recording for every five submitted. The researcher also watched a recording
if the corresponding data were outside of the expected or average for participants.
Apparatus
Participants engaged in a simulated medical record data entry task which was hosted
within a macro-enabled Excel spreadsheet. A screenshot of the task window is available in
Appendix E. For the duration of their 45-minute sessions, participants had to manually enter the
provided patient ID into the textbox and then determine whether the patient’s heart rate was
within or out of range based on the given heart rate, the sex of the patient, and the corresponding
range provided. Once they made that determination, they selected the appropriate radio button
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and clicked the submit button. Upon clicking the submit button, the program tallied the response
as correct or incorrect and then repopulated the window with new, randomized information for
the next patient. During their sessions, participants were able to show or hide a progress window
which displayed the total number of records entered, the total number correct, and the time
remaining for the session. After 45 minutes had elapsed, the program automatically terminated.
Because participants were using their own computers for sessions, they had access to
whatever programs and applications were loaded on their computer, as well as their cell phones
and internet, but were not permitted to open another Excel file on the computer during their
session. If they were to do so, there was a risk that it could crash the program and their data
would be lost. Participants were permitted to engage in other activities during their session (so
long as they do not exit the Excel window which contains the program) because, otherwise, they
might have engaged in the experimental task as a result of having nothing else to do. This could,
in turn, have masked the effects of the independent variable. Participants were told, however,
that they would not be monitored during sessions and that their recordings may or may not be
reviewed, except in the case of data irregularities which would guarantee a review.
Dependent Variables
The primary dependent variable for this study was the average number of medical records
completed correctly per session by participants. There were three secondary dependent variables
for the sessions: (a) time on task, defined as the average number of minutes per session that
participants spent performing the experimental task; (b) accuracy, defined as the average
percentage of correctly entered medical records per session; and (c) data entry rate, defined as
the average number of correct medical records divided by time on task per session. The program
automatically tracked time off task, defined as any pause in responding greater than 30 seconds.
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From this, time on task was calculated by subtracting the total time off task from the 45 minutes
that were the length of the session. Finally, two tertiary dependent variables were measured,
which were: (a) the number of times that participants clicked to show their progress and (b) the
amount of time that the progress window was open during the session.
After 45 minutes had elapsed and the program terminated, the participant was prompted
to save the file in a location on their computer that was easily found. The program’s “save as”
prompt automatically filled in the participant’s number and session number as the file name.
Once they had saved the file, the program reminded the participant to e-mail that saved file to the
researcher. The researcher was then able to unlock the file to retrieve the corresponding data for
that session. From these data, the researcher was then able to calculate the averages per session
for all of the dependent variables. E-mails from participants with these files were stored in the
experimenter’s e-mail archives and any downloaded files were stored on a password-protected
computer.
Lastly, at the end of the study, participants were given a questionnaire to assess how
stressful they found the goals and their pay system to be, as well as how satisfied they were with
the pay system. These self-report measures were used to determine if any differences existed
between the three pay systems with respect to stress and satisfaction.
Independent Variables
The independent variable for this study was the type of pay system to which participants
were exposed: fixed pay, base pay with bonuses, or piece-rate pay. All participants had five
tiered goals present throughout the experiment, regardless of the condition to which they
belonged.
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Tiered Goals
The tiered goals were explained to participants prior to their second session and were
constant and available for every session thereafter. These goals were based on previous
experimentation conducted by Ramos (2020) and corresponded approximately to the 10th, 30th,
50th, 70th, and 90th percentiles of performance for 104 participants. Respectively, they were set at
190, 250, 310, 360, and 410 correctly completed records per session.
Pay Systems
Participants receiving fixed pay earned $9.30 per session, regardless of their performance
with the experimental task. Participants in the base pay with bonuses condition earned $4.80 as
their base pay (regardless of performance), with an additional $1.50 given for each successive
goal attainment, up to $7.50 for attaining the highest goal (resulting in a total of $12.30). In the
piece-rate pay condition, participants earned three cents per correctly completed record. If
participants in the base pay with bonuses and piece-rate pay conditions performed at average
levels (i.e., if they correctly completed 310 medical records), they earned the same amount of
money as those in the fixed pay condition (i.e., $9.30 per session). Average performance was
also determined from Ramos (2020), whose participants performed the same task and earned
either fixed pay or piece-rate pay. Data from Sundberg (2015) were not used to determine
average performance because his participants performed unusually well, as indicated by data
from three subsequent studies (Einarsson, 2016, 2018; and Ramos, 2020). It is worth noting that,
while average performances resulted in equal pay for participants regardless of the condition, it
was possible for participants in the piece-rate pay condition to earn more than participants from
the other conditions. For example, if the highest session performance from Ramos (2020) were to
have occurred in this study, that individual would have received $17.19 for that single session.
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Participants in the current study received e-mails prior to each session, beginning with the
second session, that included the following: the number of correctly completed records during
the previous session, the amount of pay received for that previous session, the total amount
earned up to that point, and the five tiered goals. Participants did not receive the pay, however,
until the end of the experiment when they were debriefed.
Experimental Design
An ordered treatments design with three conditions was employed for the current study.
Those three conditions, as described earlier, were fixed pay, base pay with bonuses, and piecerate pay. All three conditions had the same five tiered goals present throughout the study.
Participants underwent a total of six 45-minute sessions. The first session, however, was a preexperimental session that was used to determine participants’ keyboard proficiency. Performance
during this session served as a covariate for the statistical analysis.
Statistical Analyses
Because the current study used an ordered treatments design, the rank-based analysis of
covariance (ANCOVA) monotone method, described by Huitema (2011, p. 360), was used to
analyze the data. This method determined whether an increasing, monotonic trend existed
between the three conditions with respect to the average number of correctly completed medical
records per session. It was hypothesized that this ordering would take the form of the fixed pay
condition being the lowest performing and the piece-rate pay condition being highest, with the
base pay with bonuses condition being in the middle. To perform this analysis, conditions were
ranked according to this order, and the performances of participants during the covariate session
and for each experimental session thereafter were ranked, as well. As indicated earlier,
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differences in keyboard proficiency were controlled for by using performance during the preexperimental (first) session as the covariate in this analysis.
ANCOVAs were also used on the three secondary dependent variables (time on task,
accuracy, and data entry rate), as well as the two tertiary dependent variables (number of clicks
to see progress and amount of time that the progress window was open), to determine if
differences existed between the three conditions. In addition to these, Pearson product-moment
correlations were conducted between all combinations of the first four dependent variables (the
primary and three secondary) in order to determine the strength of the relationship between them.
Furthermore, a comparison of the expected goal attainment (i.e., the goal percentiles based on
Ramos, 2020) and the actual goal attainment (i.e., the percentiles from the current study) was
conducted to determine if any differences existed.
Lastly, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted between the three conditions
with respect to the amount of money earned by participants, as well as with respect to the
responses provided on a stress and satisfaction questionnaire given to participants at the end of
the study.
Experimental Procedures
Introductory Session
Prior to the initial meeting, the researcher e-mailed the participant the consent form and a
version of the experimental task, which was used for training the participant, both as attachments
to the text indicated in Introductory Session Script (Appendix F). The researcher also sent the
participant a meeting invitation for an agreed-upon time for the online introductory meeting,
which took place over WebEx (software provided free for students by the university). During
that meeting, the researcher ensured that the participant filled out the consent questionnaire and
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verified that the participant was indeed eligible to participate. If they were eligible, the researcher
then assigned the participant their participant number using a list of random numbers. Then, the
researcher introduced the participant to the experimental task using the Introductory Session
Script. Once the participant was familiar with the experimental task, the researcher then had the
participant download, install, and test their ability to have Zoom recording on their computer.
Pre-Experimental (Covariate) Session
Twenty-four hours prior to the first (pre-experimental) session for participants, the
researcher e-mailed the Excel file with the experimental task, as well as instructions which are
detailed in Appendix G. For this session, all participants, regardless of condition, were paid
piece-rate pay. These incentives were intended to ensure that participants did their best for the
purposes of determining their keyboard proficiency. Comparing the data from Einarsson (2016)
to data from Einarsson (2018) and Ramos (2020), it was seen that participants performed best
when paid piece-rate during this session than when they were paid a fixed amount. Additionally,
the performance of low performers is artificially suppressed when they are first paid fixed pay
and later piece-rate pay (Einarsson, 2018). This effect was not found when participants were paid
piece-rate pay during their pre-experimental session (Ramos, 2020). Thus, to ensure that
performance was not negatively impacted, participants were paid piece-rate during the preexperimental session in the current study.
Once participants completed the 45 minutes, the program terminated, prompted them to
save the file, and reminded them to e-mail the file as well as the Loom recording weblink to the
researcher.
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Experimental Sessions
Twenty-four hours after receiving the participant’s items from their first session, the
researcher e-mailed the participant the Pay Quiz (Appendix H). The participant had to respond
and score 100% on the quiz before they could begin their second (first experimental) session. If
the participant did not score 100% on the quiz, the researcher provided feedback on the missed
items and sent the participant a second version of the pay quiz (Appendix I).
Once the participant had scored 100% on the pay quiz and 24 hours in advance of their
scheduled session, the researcher sent them the items for their first experimental session
(Appendix J). Each experimental session thereafter followed the same procedures, requiring that
the participant had sent their items to the researcher before the researcher then sent the e-mail for
the next session. Within each of these e-mails was a pay and performance receipt, which listed
the number of correctly completed records during the previous session, the pay received for that
session, the total pay received for the study thus far, and the five tiered goals (which served as a
reminder to the participant).
For all five of the experimental sessions, the researcher did not comment on participants’
performance, he only provided the data relevant to the receipt. Johnson (2013) found that praise
and criticism could influence performance and thus impact the effects of the pay systems. Thus,
the instructional scripts indicated that no comments on performance are to be provided to
participants for fear of inadvertently providing evaluative feedback.
Debriefing
After participants had finished their final session, they scheduled a debriefing meeting
with the researcher. That meeting again took place over WebEx, for which the researcher
provided the participant with a weblink via e-mail. At least 48 hours prior to that meeting, the

38

researcher also sent the final pay and performance receipt for the participant and a link to a
Qualtrics survey containing the Stress and Satisfaction Questionnaire (Appendix K), as well as
instructions to complete that questionnaire prior to the meeting (see Appendix L for the
debriefing script). During the meeting, the researcher verified that the participant completed the
questionnaire, determined how the participant wished to be paid (in cash or via Venmo), and
then described the purpose of the study, offered to answer any questions, and thanked them for
their participation in the study. If the participant elected to be paid in cash, the researcher
scheduled a time to meet with the participant on WMU’s campus. If the participant elected
Venmo, then the researcher obtained the participant’s information and completed the transfer
during the WebEx meeting.
Integrity of the Independent Variable
All interactions between the researcher and participants were scripted in order to ensure
consistency among participants. Every day, the researcher downloaded completed sessions
submitted by participants and copy-pasted the relevant information into an Excel spreadsheet
which contained the data for every participant (coded using only participant numbers, not using
any identifying information). This spreadsheet was backed up daily to a password-protected flash
drive, as well. To reduce the chance of making an error, payout values for participants were
calculated using that same spreadsheet. Additionally, the researcher reviewed, at random, one of
every five submitted Loom recordings, as well as recordings corresponding to any file
submission which was outside of expected or average performance. Each day, after having
downloaded and reviewed the data, the researcher drafted and sent the relevant e-mails
containing the receipts, instructions, quizzes, WebEx weblinks, etc., as needed, for the upcoming
participant sessions.
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RESULTS
Primary Analyses
The means and standard deviations for the average number of correctly completed
records (the primary dependent variable) can be found in Table 1 below. These data are shown
for the three groups during the covariate and the average of the five experimental sessions. Table
2 displays the adjusted means for the average of the experimental sessions for each group.
Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for Correctly Completed Records

Condition
Fixed pay
Bonus pay
Piece-rate pay
Overall

n
25
24
22
71

Sessions
Covariate
Experimental
Mean
SD
Mean
SD
239.8
80.6
258.1
87.5
267.2
59.1
320.2
62.5
252.5
60.9
297.5
65.5
253.0
68.0
291.3
76.7

Table 2
Adjusted Means for Correctly Completed Records
Condition
Fixed pay
Bonus pay
Piece-rate pay
Overall

Adjusted Mean
270.2
307.2
297.9
291.3

Before a rank-based ANCOVA monotone analysis can be carried out, homogeneity of the
regression slopes for each group must be present. The analysis for homogeneity indicated that
the group slopes were indeed homogeneous (F = 0.013, FCV(0.05,2,65) = 3.13). As such, the rankbased ANCOVA monotone analysis (Huitema, 2011) was carried out, the source table for which
can be found in Table 3 below. The analysis failed to confirm the hypothesized relationship
between the three groups (F = 2.31, p = 0.133). There are two possible reasons for this: (a) there
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were no significant differences between all or some of the groups, or (b) differences exist, but the
ordering of the groups was not as hypothesized. It was hypothesized that the fixed pay group
would perform the worst, followed by the bonus pay group, and the piece-rate pay group would
perform the best. Thus, it is possible, for example, that the bonus pay group outperformed the
piece-rate group.
Table 3
Source Table for Rank-Based ANCOVA Monotone Analysis
Source
Covariate
Experimental Conditions
Error
Total

df
1
1
68
70

SS
19761
314.3
9260
29819

MS
19761
314.3
136.2

F
145.11
2.31

p
0.000
0.133

Because there was no statistically significant finding for the hypothesized rank-based
ordering of the three groups in this study, a traditional one-factor ANCOVA was used to
determine whether differences existed between the groups, perhaps in an ordering contrary to
that proposed. Table 4 displays the source table for the one-factor ANCOVA used to make that
determination. This ANCOVA resulted in a statistically significant difference between the
groups (F = 5.94, p = 0.004).
Table 4
Source Table for One-Factor Analysis of Covariance on Correctly Completed Records
Source
df
SS
MS
Covariate
1 263737 263737
Experimental Conditions 2 17663
8832
Error
67 99676
1488
Total
70 411821

F
177.28
5.94

p
0.000
0.004

However, by nature of a statistically significant result from an ANCOVA, it is unknown
which group or groups are different. Thus, Fisher-Hayter tests were performed on the each of the
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three two-group permutations. The adjusted means for the fixed pay, bonus pay, and piece-rate
pay groups were 270.2, 307.2, and 297.9, respectively. Using the Fisher-Hayter tests, it was
found that a difference between the fixed pay and bonus pay groups (adjusted mean difference of
37.0) was statistically significant (q = 4.68, p = 0.002). The difference between the fixed pay and
piece-rate pay groups (adjusted mean difference of 27.7) was also statistically significant (q =
3.46, p = 0.017). The difference between the bonus pay and piece-rate pay groups (adjusted
mean difference of 9.3), however, was not significant (q = 1.15, p = 0.419). This non-significant
comparison explains the non-significant finding from the rank-based ANCOVA monotone
method: Because there was no statistically significant difference between the bonus pay and
piece-rate pay groups, this violated the assumption of monotonicity for the original analysis.
Although it is statistically irrelevant due to the faults that lie with performing an
unplanned analysis, it is worth noting that altering the hypothesized ordering does indeed result
in a statistically significant finding. If, instead, we rank order the groups as (a) fixed pay, (b)
piece-rate pay, and (c) bonus pay, the resulting rank-based ANCOVA monotone analysis
indicates that a monotonic relationship does exist (F = 7.64, p = 0.007). This implies that,
between the bonus pay and piece-rate pay groups, a difference exists which was not sufficiently
large for the Fisher-Hayter test to detect, yet is detectable by the rank-based ANCOVA
monotone method in this ordering. The disparity here is due in part to the conservative nature of
the Fisher-Hayter test (to avoid multiplicity), which is a two-tailed test, and in part to the power
of the rank-based ANCOVA monotone method, which is a one-tailed test. Regardless, because
this ordering was not originally hypothesized, its statistical significance cannot be considered a
valid result of this research.
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Secondary Analyses
Because the primary dependent variable might have been impacted by the secondary
dependent variables, the means and standard deviations were calculated on the average of the
five experimental sessions for time on task, data entry rate, and accuracy. These are provided in
Table 5. ANCOVAs were conducted on the three secondary dependent variables, as well. A
statistically significant difference was found with time on task (F = 3.44, p = 0.038) and with
data entry rate (F = 3.27, p = 0.044), indicating a difference existed between the pay systems.
For the time on task, Fisher-Hayter tests determined that no significant difference existed
between the bonus pay and piece-rate pay groups but did exist between the fixed pay group and
bonus pay group (q = 3.46, p = 0.017), as well as between the fixed pay group and piece-rate pay
group (q = 2.92, p = 0.043). For the data entry rate, Fisher-Hayter tests revealed that only the
difference between the fixed pay group and bonus pay groups was statistically significant (q =
3.62, p = 0.013).
Table 5
Means and Standard Deviations for Accuracy, Data Entry Rate, and Time on Task

Condition
Fixed pay
Bonus pay
Piece-rate pay

n
25
24
22

Time on Task
Mean
SD
39.92 6.88
43.95 1.99
43.92 1.88

Data Entry Rate
Mean
SD
6.46
1.32
7.26
1.28
6.75
1.355

Accuracy
Mean
SD
97.32% 1.34%
97.95% 1.04%
97.41% 1.23%

Additionally, Pearson product-moment correlations were calculated between the primary
dependent variable and the three secondary dependent variables. The results of these correlations
can be found in Table 6. The number of correctly completed records was significantly positively
correlated with all three secondary dependent variables, which indicates that they each had an
effect on the number of correct records completed by participants. It is also evident from the
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table that the three secondary dependent variables were significantly (positively) correlated with
one another.
Table 6
Correlations between the Primary and Secondary Dependent Variables
Dependent Variable
Correctly completed medical records
Time on Task
Rate
*p < 0.01. **p < 0.001.

Time on Task
0.733**

Rate
0.910**
0.419**

Accuracy
0.450**
0.509**
0.317*

Tertiary Analyses
An ANCOVA was conducted on the number of times participants clicked to show the
progress window per session, as well as on the amount of time (in minutes) the progress window
was visible per session. In both cases, no significant difference was found between the groups (F
= 0.22, p = 0.639 and F = 2.78, p = 0.100, respectively). Table 7 shows the means and standard
deviations for both variables.
Table 7
Means and Standard Deviations for Number of Clicks and Amount of Time for Progress

Condition
Fixed pay
Bonus pay
Piece-rate pay

n
25
24
22

Number of Clicks
Mean
SD
2.6
2.54
3.1
3.41
2.6
3.46

Amount of Time
Mean
SD
18.8
19.88
15.0
16.02
14.5
15.95

Accuracy of the Percentiles for the Tiered Goals
Table 8 shows the comparison of the percentiles between actual performance and
expected performance (taken from Ramos, 2020). The percentiles were determined by averaging
each participant’s number of correctly completed records from the five experimental sessions
and ranking those averages. It can be seen that, for the three lower percentiles, performance was
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within ±12 correctly completed records. However, for the two highest goals (70th and 90th
percentiles), performance was markedly lower in the current study (27 and 33 correct records per
session, respectively. These large discrepancies indicate that perhaps the goals were set too high
and thus served as stretch goals (in that fewer participants were able to achieve them than was
expected). This, in turn, may have punished goal-oriented behavior for those who were unable to
reach those goals.
Table 8
Expected and Actual Performance Related to Tiered Goals
Percentile
10th
30th
50th
70th
90th

Expected Performance
190
250
310
360
410

Actual Performance
195
255
298
333
377

Amount of Pay Earned
An ANOVA was conducted to determine whether a difference existed between the three
groups with respect to the amount of pay earned by participants. Table 9 displays the means and
standard deviations for the amount of pay earned by each group. Table 10 displays the source
table for the ANOVA, which indicated that there was no significant difference for the amount of
pay earned by participants with respect to the type of pay system (F = 0.17, p = 0.842).
Table 9
Means for Money Earned
Condition
Fixed pay
Bonus pay
Piece-rate pay
Overall

Mean
$53.69
$52.89
$52.20
$52.96

SD
$2.42
$10.02
$11.43
$8.63
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Table 10
Source Table for One-Factor Analysis of Variance for Money Earned
Source
df
SS
MS
Experimental Conditions 2 26.38 13.19
Error
68 5192.4 76.36
Total
70 5218.8

F
0.17

p
0.842

Questionnaire Analysis
All 71 participants answered the post-study questionnaire, which consisted of three
questions. Each question used a 5-point Likert scale. In the case of the satisfaction question, 5
represented “completely satisfied” and 1 represented “completely dissatisfied”. For the two stress
questions, 5 represented “extremely stressful” and 1 represented “not at all stressful”. The means
and standard deviations for each of the three questions can be found in Tables 11, 12, and 13.
ANOVAs were conducted to determine if differences existed between the three groups
for the pay system satisfaction and stress questions. Tables 14, 15, and 16 display the source
tables for these analyses. The only significant finding was for the question “How stressful did
you find the pay system to be?” (F = 3.15, p = 0.049). Fisher-Hayter tests determined that only
participants who received bonus pay reported that the pay system was more stressful than only
those who received fixed pay (q = 3.57, p = 0.014). There was no significant difference between
the fixed pay group and piece-rate pay group, nor between the bonus pay group and piece-rate
pay group.
Table 11
Means for "How Satisfied Were You with the Pay System?"
Condition
Fixed pay
Bonus pay
Piece-rate pay
Overall

Mean
4.84
4.67
4.82
4.77

SD
0.47
1.71
1.41
0.45
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Table 12
Means for "How Stressful Did You Find the Pay System to Be?"
Condition
Fixed pay
Bonus pay
Piece-rate pay
Overall

Mean
1.28
1.71
1.41
1.46

SD
0.54
0.69
0.59
0.63

Table 13
Means for "How Stressful Did You Find the Goals to Be?"
Condition
Fixed pay
Bonus pay
Piece-rate pay
Overall

Mean
2.00
2.13
1.91
2.01

SD
0.76
0.61
1.02
0.80

Table 14
One-Factor ANOVA Source Table for "How Satisfied Were You with the Pay System?"
Source
df
SS
MS
Experimental Conditions 2 0.4283 0.2142
Error
68 13.9661 0.2054
Total
70 14.3944

F
1.04

p
0.358

Table 15
One-Factor ANOVA Source Table for "How Stressful Did You Find the Pay System to Be?"
Source
df
SS
MS
Experimental Conditions 2 2.345 1.1727
Error
68 25.317 0.3723
Total
70 27.662

F
3.15

47

p
0.049

Table 16
One-Factor ANOVA Source Table for "How Stressful Did You Find the Goals to Be?"
Source
df
SS
MS
Experimental Conditions 2 0.5427 0.2714
Error
68 44.4432 0.6536
Total
70 44.9859

F
0.42
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p
0.662

DISCUSSION
Primary Results
This study sought to determine whether a ranked ordering exists between the
performance of participants when given tiered goals and one of three pay systems. It was
hypothesized that the fixed pay group would perform the worst, the base pay with bonuses group
would perform in the middle, and the piece-rate pay group would perform the best. The results of
the primary analysis, a rank-based ANCOVA monotone method, showed no statistical
significance for such an ordering. As a result, a one-factor ANCOVA was carried out to
determine if any differences exist between the groups, albeit perhaps not in the hypothesized
ordering. Consistent with earlier research that compared incentive systems to wage pay (Garbers
& Konradt, 2014; Jenkin et al., 1998), the results of this analysis and subsequent Fisher-Hayter
tests indicated that the fixed pay group performed significantly worse than both the base pay
with bonuses group and the piece-rate pay group. However, the base pay with bonuses and piecerate pay groups were not statistically different from one another. To summarize, participants who
were given base pay with bonuses performed 13.7% better than those given fixed pay, and those
given piece-rate pay performed 10.2% better than those given fixed pay.
The significant differences found between the fixed pay group and the piece-rate pay
group partially replicated the results found by Ramos (2020) and Sundberg (2015). In Ramos
(2020), participants who were given tiered goals and piece-rate pay outperformed those given
tiered goals and fixed pay by 11.2%. In Sundberg (2015), the same comparison found a
difference of 21.7% – however, perhaps due to the variability in Sundberg’s participant
performance, this result was not statistically significant. The findings of other earlier studies are
similarly aligned where fixed pay and piece-rate pay are concerned, although these studies had
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either no goals or a single goal (Chung & Vickery, 1976; Gaetani et al., 1985; LaMere et al.,
1996; Lazear, 2000; Pritchard & Curtis, 1973; Terborg & Miller, 1978). In these studies, those
who earned piece-rate pay outperformed those who earned fixed pay.
As indicated earlier, because of the non-significant finding from the rank-based
ANCOVA monotone method, a one-factor ANCOVA and Fisher-Hayter tests were used to
compare the adjusted average performance between the three groups. The results of the current
study are therefore a noteworthy addition to the existing literature comparing piece-rate pay and
base pay with bonuses (Lee et al., 1997; Mowen et al., 1981). In these earlier studies, when
piece-rate pay was compared to base pay with bonuses, an interaction effect was discovered with
respect to the performance of participants in each group, depending on which difficulty level
their goal was set at. In summary, the piece-rate pay condition outperformed the base pay with
bonuses condition when both groups were assigned the highest goal, and the base pay with
bonuses condition outperformed when both were given a moderate goal (the results when given a
low goal differed between the two studies). The current study, in contrast, found that there was
no significant performance difference between these two groups when given tiered goals, rather
than a single (low, moderate, or high) goal as in Lee et al. and Mowen et al. Thus, when
feedback is provided, tiered goals may eliminate the interaction effects that occur when single
goals are used, particularly when goals are difficult. Further, tiered goals may serve to bolster the
effects of a bonus pay system to the level of being on par with a piece-rate pay system in terms
of participant performance.
Organizations may be interested to know that a base pay with bonuses system paired with
tiered goals could result in performance on par with that of piece-rate pay with tiered goals.
Piece-rate pay systems are often challenging to implement and oversee, due to their complexity,
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need for additional support, and (if all employees cannot be paid in the same manner) consequent
inequity in pay (Dickinson & Gillette, 1994; Lawler, 1990, 2000). Thus, for many organizations,
a base pay with bonuses system may be easier to implement and oversee than a piece-rate pay
system, since the bonus pay is based on the achievement of goals rather than individual pieces.
Granted, the development of a tiered goal system and monitoring of goal attainment is still more
complex than a traditional fixed pay system, but the resulting increase in productivity may
warrant the shift, especially if it results in performance on par with that of piece-rate pay.
Additionally, a bonus system can likely be adapted to more types of jobs within an organization,
such as those whose timelines to completion are lengthy, or those where outputs are not as easily
quantifiable.
Secondary Analyses
One-factor ANCOVAs were used to compare the differences between the three groups
with respect to time on task, data entry rate, and accuracy. In alignment with the primary
analyses, a significant difference was found between the fixed pay group and base pay with
bonuses group on both time on task and data entry rate. There was also a significant difference
between the fixed pay group and piece-rate pay group with respect to time on task, but not with
respect to data entry rate. No significant differences were found with respect to accuracy, likely
because of a ceiling effect (the average accuracy of each group was near 100%).
In fact, the correlation between the number of correctly completed records and the data
entry rate was quite high (r = 0.91), with the correlation between the number of correctly
completed records and the time on task being slightly lower (r = 0.73). Both the base pay with
bonuses group and piece-rate pay group were on task 10% more than the fixed pay group, on
average. With respect to the data entry rate between these two comparisons, the base pay with
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bonuses group was 12.4% above the fixed pay group, while the piece-rate pay group was only
4.5% above the fixed pay group. Thus, these findings indicate that time on task and data entry
rate were likely the main drivers behind the performance difference observed between the
groups. The strengths of these and the remaining correlations align with earlier research that has
used similar data entry tasks and used the same dependent variables (Einarsson, 2018; McGee et
al., 2006; Ramos, 2020; VanStelle, 2012).
Lastly, it is worth noting that accuracy was moderately correlated with the number of
correctly completed records (r = 0.45). This implies that participants with higher accuracy were
more likely to be higher performers, as well. In other words, high performance did not
necessarily have an adverse impact on quality (accuracy). In fact, quite the opposite: A
participant who emphasized quality was more likely to perform well, likely because the primary
dependent variable of the study, the number of correctly completed records, is a measure of both
quantity and quality.
Tertiary Analyses
No significant difference was found between any of the groups with respect to the
number of times participants clicked to show the progress window during a session, nor with
respect to the amount of time the progress window stayed open during each session. There were
large standard deviations and minor differences between the averages of both dependent
variables across the three groups. Thus, it is unlikely that the independent variables controlled
the behavior of clicking to show the progress window.
Questionnaire Analyses
In all conditions, participants indicated they were very satisfied with their respective pay
system. The overall mean rating was 4.77/5.00, with 5 indicating complete satisfaction and 1
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indicating complete dissatisfaction. Similar to Ramos (2020) and Sundberg (2015), there was no
significant difference found between any of the mean ratings, which ranged from 4.67 to 4.84, on
this question.
With respect to participant stress with the tiered goals, results were similar in that there
again was no significant difference between the groups. The overall mean rating was 2.01/5.00,
with the mean group rating ranging from 1.91 to 2.13, where 1 indicated not at all stressful and 5
indicated extremely stressful. Thus, participants on average found the tiered goals to be slightly
stressful. This again aligns with the findings of Ramos (2020); Sundberg (2015) did not question
participants on their stress level related to the tiered goals.
Lastly, there was a significant difference discovered regarding how stressful participants
found the pay systems to be. Although the overall rating of 1.46/5.00 indicated that participants
found their respective pay system to be only slightly stressful (a rating of 1 indicated not at all
stressful), the range was from an average of 1.28 for the fixed pay condition to an average of
1.71 for the base pay with bonuses group. These two groups were in fact the sole significant
difference; no significant difference was found between the fixed pay and piece-rate pay groups,
nor between the piece-rate pay and base pay with bonuses groups. Thus, one can conclude that
the participants found the base pay with bonuses system to be more stressful than the fixed pay
system. These findings are at odds with those of Ramos (2020) and Sundberg (2015). In Ramos,
a significant difference was found between the piece-rate pay and fixed pay conditions, a
difference that was not significant in the current study. In Sundberg, no significant difference
between the stress ratings for the different pay systems was found, but this may have been a
result of the high variability (consequently due to the small groups and goals that were set too
high) in that study. The lack of a significant difference between the fixed pay and piece-rate pay
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group in the current study (as well as Sundberg) with respect to the stress level of each type of
pay system go against earlier research (Honeywell-Johnson et al., 2002; Johnson, 2005).
For the current study, this may have been due to the attrition rate that was witnessed in
the piece-rate pay group, which lost 11 of a total of 33 recruited participants (33.3%). Eight of
those 11 dropped out or were removed by the researcher (for not completing sessions on time)
after having completed at least the covariate session. The fixed pay group had an attrition rate of
13.8% and the base pay with bonuses group had a rate of 14.3%. Thus, it is possible that, if
participants dropped out from groups because of the stress resulting from the respective pay
systems, the ratings given by the piece-rate pay participants would have been higher. In fact, this
is entirely plausible, as one participant in the piece-rate pay group specifically asked to be
removed from study after completing their first session, stating that it was too stressful.
Consequently, the difference between the stress related to fixed pay and that related to piece-rate
pay, which was found to be significant by earlier studies may have indeed been significant in the
current study if only the questionnaire had been given to all participants, rather than only to those
who completed the study.
Other Analyses
With respect to the tiered goals, the actual performance of participants in this study was
not aligned with those of Ramos (2020), from which the goals in this study were determined. As
a result, the third, fourth, and fifth goals were set too high. The overall average mean number of
correctly completed records for the five experimental sessions was 291.3, which was nearly 20
records below the expected performance of 310. The primary contributor to this was the fixed
pay with tiered goals group, which averaged 258.1 correct records in this study, compared to
290.5 of the fixed pay with tiered goals group in Ramos (a difference of 32.4). Similarly, the
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piece-rate pay with tiered goals group in this study underperformed the equivalent group in
Ramos by 30.6 correct records (the average performance of each was 297.5 and 328.1,
respectively). Thus, it is possible that the cause is something specific about the methodology of
this study compared to that of Ramos (see Limitations, below, for greater detail).
The amount of pay earned by participants between the groups was not significantly
different. This is consistent with Ramos (2020) and indicates that the amount of pay participants
earned was not responsible for the differences in performance found between the groups. In this
study, the overall average pay earned by participants was $52.96, with the low end being the
piece-rate pay condition earning $52.20 and the high end being the fixed pay condition earning
$53.69.
Stemming from the disparity between the groups in the current study and the equivalent
groups in Ramos (2020), ANCOVAs were run on the average number of correctly completed
records between like groups from each study. A statistically significant difference was found in
the both cases: The fixed pay with tiered goals groups (F = 10.35, p = 0.002), as well as the
piece-rate pay with tiered goals groups (F =16.40, p < 0.001). Thus, performance in the current
study was significantly lower than that of Ramos in the case of both the fixed pay group and the
piece-rate pay group. The possible causes for this are discussed in Limitations, below.
Strengths
This was the first study to use this experimental task in a remote setting and to compare
the performance of remote participants to that of in-person participants (from an earlier study).
Additionally, because of the experimental control resulting from the manipulation of the
conditions in this study, the effects of the independent variables were isolated not only from each
other, but also from other common variables found in applied settings. The researcher also took
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great care to ensure that communication with participants did not include any sort of evaluative
feedback, as it may have impacted their performance.
Finally, because this was the first time this experimental task was carried out remotely,
many discoveries were made that will allow future researchers who use the same task in remote
settings to have greater experimental control and fewer challenges to overcome. The main of
these discoveries was regarding instructions and interactions with participants, to ensure that
they completed everything that was required of them with their sessions (and that they did so in a
timely manner). To that end, instructions were explicit, sessions were scheduled for specific
times chosen by the participants, and reminder e-mails were sent 15 minutes before those times.
Technological challenges were also prominent, and so much care was taken with respect to the
specificity of the onboarding and training of participants (including having them engage in
everything they would need to do for their sessions), as well as ensuring that e-mail
communications included reminders on both the most critical and the most often forgotten (or
incorrectly done) aspects of the sessions.
Limitations
It is worth noting that the calculations for participant pay in the current study were based
on the piece-rate pay of an average participant at $0.03 per correct record. In Ramos (2020), it
was based on $0.02 per correct record. This change was an attempt to update the pay amount to
align with changes in the minimum wage. However, it may have ultimately been responsible for
the disparity in the data between similar groups from Ramos and the current study. Because
participants in the incentive pay groups of the current study could perform at a lower comparable
level and yet earn the same as in Ramos 2020, it is possible that this made it so that participants
consequently performed at those lower levels. However, participants in the current study had not
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participated in this experimental task before – and many were first-year students in their first
semester – so it is unlikely that their performance would have been limited by a self-stated
ceiling based on the previous research.
What is more likely is that, because the highest three goals were set too high, the majority
of participants were not able to meet each higher goal level, and thus average performance
peaked below the third goal. In effect, the average effort made by over 50% of participants was
not followed by attainment of the third goal, with that trend continuing for the fourth and fifth
goals (where over 70% and 90% of participants, respectively, did not attain the goal). As such,
these higher-level goals were more akin to stretch goals and so performance was not reinforced
in those majority of cases, making it so that overall performance was lower than expected.
However, this is truer for the fixed pay and piece-rate pay groups (whose pay was not dependent
on goal attainment) than it is for the base pay with bonuses group, whose average performance
was actually ten records above the third goal.
It is also likely that participant performance was undermined by the fact they were
engaging in the experimental task remotely. In Ramos (2020), participants engaged in the task in
a laboratory setting, with all participants using the same three identical desktop computers with
Microsoft Windows operating system installed. In the current task, participants were free to do
the task in a location of their choosing, so long as they were uninterrupted for the 45 minutes,
and they had to use their personal computer. For the overwhelming majority of participants, their
personal computer was a laptop, and for nearly half (47.8%) of them, the operating system was
Macintosh. While no significant difference was found between the performance of participants
based on their computer’s operating system in the current study, it is clear that something about
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the setting and apparatus of their sessions did negatively impact their performance compared to
those in Ramos.
Three possible causes for this exist: (a) the typical laptop computer does not have a
number pad on the keyboard, and participants may not have had a separate mouse, so instead
they had to rely on the trackpad to engage in the experimental task; (b) as much as participants
carried out their sessions in areas where they would not get interrupted, competing contingencies
were ever present; and (c) with the exception of the recordings and their performance being
tracked by the program, participants were entirely unsupervised during their 45-minute sessions.
Cause (a) can likely be dismissed because, when a t-test was performed on the covariate
data comparing all participants in the current study to those in Ramos (2020), no significant
difference was discovered (t = 1.43, p = 0.153). In fact, the average performance of participants
in the covariate session for the current study was 247.8, compared to 234.3 in Ramos. In addition
to this, the nature of the covariate session in the analysis accounts for the impact of the difference
in equipment in that all of the experimental sessions completed by participants were presumably
completed using the same equipment as in the covariate session, and so their performance is
adjusted accordingly. Thus, it is unlikely that the type of computer participants used was the
main hindrance to their performance in this study.
More likely, it was cause (b), the competing contingencies in the environment of the
participant. Based on the review of the video recordings taken by participants of their sessions,
the overwhelming majority completed their experimental sessions at home (be it their dorm
room, apartment, or house). Furthermore, although participants were allowed to listen to music,
play games, etc. during their sessions (just as in Ramos, 2020), the average amount of time spent
on task by participants in both the fixed pay with tiered goals and piece-rate pay with tiered goals
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groups in the current study was 2507.6 seconds compared to 2557.5 seconds for the same two
groups in Ramos. Similarly, the average data entry rate was 6.59 in the current study compared
to 7.20 in Ramos. Furthermore, recall that time off task is defined as any pause in responding
greater than 30 seconds. Thus, any distractions that took less than 30 seconds (sending a quick
text to a friend, for example) were not accounted for by the time on task measurement.
Anecdotally, in their videos, participants were seen spending time on their phone, lounging on
their bed, eating snacks, engaging with their pet, talking to their roommate, and even taking a
quick phone call. The methodological differences between the current study and Ramos, caused
by the differences in setting, unfortunately do not allow for a similar anecdotal telling of the
events that transpired during participants’ sessions (they were on the opposite side of a partition
as the researcher). However, many of the distractions that occurred in the current study would
not have been possible in Ramos: Pets were not allowed in the laboratory, participants were not
allowed to make phone calls because it would have distracted other participants, no food or
drinks were allowed at the computers, etc.
Finally, to cause (c): In Ramos (2020), due to the laboratory setting, it was possible that a
researcher would witness the participant being off task during the session. After all, there were
times when three participants were engaging in the task simultaneously (on three separate
computers), all separated from the researchers by a partition. Any time a participant started or
ended a session, a researcher had to cross that partition to prepare or close down the session for
that participant, and so the researcher would be in sight of the remaining participants. Thus, even
though participants in both studies were explicitly told that they could engage in other activities
during their session, it is possible that the resulting social pressures (of being “caught” off task
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by a researcher) perceived by the participants in Ramos, which were not present in the current
study, increased the overall performance of participants.
While the aforementioned confounds were perhaps detrimental to the experimental
control and, therefore, the results of this study, those same uncontrolled variables are likely to be
a common part of a work-from-home setting. In other words, when employees work remotely,
the contingencies present in their day-to-day will of course be different than those if they were
working in an office. Furthermore, the competing contingencies are going to be different for
every employee, depending on their home environment. Thus, while the confounds were perhaps
a weakness in this study, they also provided for a more realistic approximation of a true workfrom-home environment.
Future Research
The current study resulted in what could become a bifurcation in the lines of research
within the performance literature. On the one hand, further research should continue with respect
to the disparities between in-person and remote work. This is particularly relevant as we are still
in the midst of the Coronavirus-19 pandemic, with many jobs becoming remote. On the other
hand, the line of research with tiered goals would greatly benefit from further enlightenment.
While this study replicated some earlier findings (Ramos, 2020), it also created an opportunity
for determining whether piece-rate pay and bonus pay truly are not significantly different when
tiered goals are leveraged.
On the branch of in-person versus remote work, research could be done to compare one
condition where participants engage in the task in a laboratory setting to another condition where
they engage in the task remotely (as in this study). Of course, researchers would have to be very
deliberate in their design of the experiment to ensure that social contingencies, supervision,
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feedback, and settings/apparatus are held constant where possible. For example, participants
could use their own computer in both conditions, and the researcher could run a single
participant at a time, only preparing them for the session and then disappearing for the length of
the session. It would also be interesting to see the results of a study designed to determine
whether varying levels of oversight during remote work impact the quantity and quality of
performance. For example, one condition could be as in this study, where participants were given
written instructions for their sessions but otherwise left to themselves to complete the sessions;
another condition could have the researcher set them up for the session and remain on a video
call during the session, but not focused on the participants; and yet another condition could
involve the researcher being fully involved in the session.
On the branch of continuing with tiered goals, future researchers could begin by looking
at the difference of in-person performance between piece-rate pay and base pay with bonuses,
each with the same five tiered goals as used in this study, but also without tiered goals in the case
of piece-rate pay. Depending on the outcomes of that study, and comparing to the results of this
current study, later research could delve into manipulating the quantity of tiered goals. If indeed
base pay with bonuses is equivalent to piece-rate pay when participants are given tiered goals,
then it is possible that there is a “sweet spot” with respect to the number of tiered goals, where
performance in the bonus pay condition will begin to approximate that of a piece-rate pay
condition. If so, it would be useful for organizations to know where that sweet spot exists, as it
would potentially reduce the effort required to create and oversee a goals-and-bonus system
while ensuring peak performance. This would also possibly expand the number and types of jobs
to which businesses could more easily create incentive systems that would result in top-tier
performance.
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Summary
The results of this study contribute to the goal-setting literature by partially replicating
the results of Ramos (2020) in a remote setting: Piece-rate pay with tiered goals results in higher
performance than fixed pay with tiered goals. Additionally, at least within the methodology of
this research, base pay with bonuses and tiered goals results in equivalent performance levels as
piece-rate pay with tiered goals. This is potentially a major finding for organizations, in that a
goals-and-bonus system is generally easier to implement than a piece-rate pay system.
It is also worth noting that the comparisons between in-person and remote work, made
between Ramos (2020) and the current study, lend insight into the effects of either setting on
performance. Tentatively, participants in a remote setting performed significantly worse than
those completing the task in a laboratory. Of course, methodological differences between the two
studies need to be addressed for this to be more confidently stated.
As such, it is hoped that future researchers will investigate whether a disparity indeed
exists between the performance of in-person and remote workers. It is also hoped that future
researchers will continue to pursue the questions relating to comparisons of piece-rate pay and
base pay with bonuses, both with tiered goals. The ultimate outcome for these lines of research is
to uncover the answers for organizations regarding whether in-person or remote settings result in
better performance (and how best to structure the contingencies within each), and whether
employees are best incentivized by a simpler means than piece-rate pay.
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Hello, my name is Alejandro Ramos. I am a graduate student in psychology and I am
looking for participants for my doctoral dissertation. This project studies how individuals
perform on a simulated medical data entry task.
The data entry task is a simple, computer-based task that requires someone to read and
enter numbers using a computer’s numeric keypad. You will be working on this task remotely,
using your own computer. There will be six sessions during the semester, each 45 minutes long,
which you can schedule as like, but no more than once per day, and must be completed within
six weeks of beginning the study. You will earn approximately $9.30 per session, and thus about
$55.80 if you complete the study.
In order to participate, you must not have participated in other studies that have used the
medical data entry task, must not have taken PSY 3440 (Organizational Psychology), and must
not have taken nor be currently enrolled in PSY 2444 or PSY 3444. You must also be available
for six sessions throughout the semester, have your own computer with a webcam, and have
WebEx and Loom (video-recording software, free from Google) installed on that computer.
Your participation is voluntary and you may withdraw from the study at any time. If you
do choose to withdraw, you will be paid for your participation up to the point of withdrawal.
Your participation, lack thereof, or withdrawal from the study will not affect your grade in this
class or any other. Your identity in this study will be kept confidential.
If you are interested in participating and you would like further information about this
study, please e-mail alejandro.ramos@wmich.edu or text Alejandro at (616) 648-0445.
Thank you for your time and, for any of you who choose to participate, thank you in
advance for your help with my dissertation!
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Western Michigan University
Department of Psychology
Principal Investigator:
Student Investigator:
Title of Study:

Douglas A. Johnson, Ph.D.
Alejandro Ramos, M.A.
Performance on a Simulated Medical Data Entry Task

You have been invited to participate in a research project titled "Performance on a Simulated
Medical Data Entry Task." This project will serve as Alejandro Ramos’s dissertation under the
supervision of Douglas A. Johnson, Ph.D. This consent document will explain the purpose of this
research project and will go over all of the time commitments, the procedures used in the study,
and the risks and benefits of participating in this research project. Please read this consent form
carefully and completely, and please ask any questions if you need more clarification.
What are we trying to find out in this study?
This study aims to gather information about individuals’ performance levels on a computerbased simulated medical data entry task.
Who can participate in this study?
We are recruiting college students enrolled in courses at Western Michigan University. There are
four criteria you must meet in order to participate: 1) You must not have previously participated
in research that used the medical data entry task. 2) You must not have taken Organizational
Psychology (PSY 3440) and must not have taken or be currently enrolled in Organizational
Psychology (PSY 2444) or Advanced OBM (PSY 3444). 3) You must be available for six 45minute sessions throughout this semester and cannot take more than six weeks to complete the
study. 4) You must have your own computer with a functional webcam and Windows or
Macintosh operating system.
Where will this study take place?
The initial meeting with the researcher will be via WebEx, a video-conferencing application, on
your personal computer. Therefore, you will need to have WebEx installed on your computer.
For students of Western Michigan University (WMU), WebEx is available for free. Future
sessions will be again be held on your personal computer. For these, you will need to install
Loom, a video-recording program available for free from Google, and Microsoft Excel, available
for free for students of WMU.
What is the time commitment for participating in this study?
You must be available for six 45-minute sessions throughout the semester.
What will you be asked to do if you choose to participate in this study?
You will be asked to perform a computer-based medical record data entry task, a task designed
to simulate the job of a medical transcriptionist. The computer program will provide data
corresponding to “patients.” You will first look for the “Patient ID number” and type it into the
correct location. Then, you will look at whether the patient is male or female and, based on the
ranges provided for the respective gender, you will determine whether the patient’s data is
“within range” or “outside of range” by clicking the appropriate button. During the sessions, you
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will also be asked to video record yourself and your computer screen. After your last
experimental session, you will be asked to answer questions about your experiences during the
study. Following that, your performance during the study will be reviewed and any questions you
have about the study will be answered.
What information is being measured during the study?
The computer will automatically take measures of your performance on the medical data entry
task. You will also be recording your sessions using Loom and providing those recordings to the
experimenter. Lastly, at the end of the study, you will be asked to indicate your satisfaction with
the procedures in the study and how much stress you felt during the study.
What are the risks of participating in this study and how will these risks be minimized?
You may experience some minor physical discomfort, minor fatigue, or minor stress when you
are performing the task. These risks will be minimized by the fact that you will be able to take
breaks whenever you want during the session. During these breaks, you may choose to play a
game on your computer, browse the internet, or spend time on your cell phone.
What are the benefits of participating in this study?
You will be contributing to the field of research on performance. You may also learn about this
through your participation in this study. This study will add to our understanding of how working
conditions affect performance, satisfaction, and stress. The findings from laboratory studies such
as this can be applied in the workplace.
Are there any costs associated with participating in this study?
Besides the time commitment, there are no costs associated with participation in this study.
Is there any compensation for participating in this study?
For each 45-minute session including the training session, you will earn about $9.30 for a total of
$55.80, but the amount you earn may be dependent on your performance. You will be paid in
cash or by Venmo at the end of the 6th and final session. If you decide to withdraw from this
study, you will be paid for your performance up to the point of withdrawal.
Who will have access to the information collected during this study?
The principal investigator, the student investigator, and the research assistants will have access to
the information collected during this study. When you begin the study, you will be assigned a
number so that your individual progress can be tracked while your identity is held strictly
confidential. When the data of the study are presented or published, only group data will be
presented. Neither your name nor any identifying characteristics will be used. Video recordings
will be stored on a password-protected computer accessible only by the student investigator and
will be deleted upon the conclusion of data analysis.
What if you want to stop participating in this study?
You can choose to stop participating in the study at any time for any reason, without penalty.
The investigator can also decide to stop your participation in the study without your consent. If
you do not finish the study, you will be paid for your participation up to the point of withdrawal.
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If you have any questions before or during the study, you can e-mail Alejandro Ramos at
alejandro.ramos@wmich.edu. You may also contact the primary investigator Dr. Douglas
Johnson at douglas.johnson@wmich.edu You may also contact the Chair, Human Subjects
Institutional Review Board at (269) 387-8293 or the Vice President for Research at (269) 3878298 if questions arise during the course of the study.
This study was approved by the Western Michigan University Institutional Review Board
(WMU IRB) on October 26, 2021
I have read this informed consent document. By clicking on the link below, I agree to take part in
this study and agree to the use of video and audio recordings.
https://qfreeaccountssjc1.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_d1rqeX1Skwpv1yt
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INTRODUCTORY SESSION SCRIPT (ALL GROUPS)
Forty-eight hours before meeting with the participant for their introductory session, send them
the below text in an e-mail, along with a copy of the consent form and the “Medical Data Record
Entry Task – Introduction” file which you will attach to the same e-mail. Also send the
participant a separate 30-minute WebEx meeting invitation scheduled at the agreed-upon time
for the introductory session meeting.
Hello [Participant’s Name],
Thank you for your willingness to participate in our research study.
Before you meet with the researcher via WebEx, please do the following:
1. Read through the attached consent form
2. Once you have read the consent form, if you choose to participate, then please fill out
the consent form and questionnaire by visiting
https://qfreeaccountssjc1.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_d1rqeX1Skwpv1yt (this is the
same link that is within the consent form document)
3. If you do not have Microsoft Excel installed on your computer, please follow these
steps:
a. Visit http://wexchange.wmich.edu
b. Log in with your WMU username and password
c. Click the Home button at the top left
d. Click on “Install Office” at the top right
e. In the drop-down, select “Office 365 Apps”
f. Follow through with the installation process
4. If you do not have Loom installed on your computer, please do the following:
a. Visit https://www.loom.com/signup
b. If you don’t already have an account, create one. Otherwise, log in.
c. At the top right, click “More”
d. In the drop-down, select “Desktop App; a new window will open
e. Select “Install App” under the Desktop App on the left-hand side of the
window
f. Follow through with the installation process
You will receive a separate e-mail for a WebEx meeting invitation scheduled for the time we
discussed. When that time comes, please click on the link within that e-mail to open up and
begin the meeting with me.
If you have any questions between now and then, please don’t hesitate to ask.
I look forward to meeting with you,
[Your Name]
During your WebEx meeting with the student, you will do the following:
1. Ensure that they:
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a. Have a functioning webcam
b. Filled out the Qualtrics consent form and questionnaire
i. If they have completed the form and they both qualify for and consented
to the study, assign them a participant number
c. Installed Microsoft Excel 365 on their computer
i. If they have not or are having difficulties, walk them through how to do
this by following the steps on the previous page for downloading Excel
d. Installed Loom on their computer
i. If they have not or are having difficulties, walk them through how to do
this by following the steps on the previous page for downloading Loom
2. Walk the participant through how to use Loom on their computer. To do this, share your
screen with them. Open Loom, and for the remainder of this step, speak aloud what you
are doing. Select “Screen + Cam” and “Full Screen”, then click “Start Recording”. After
a few seconds have passed, click the “Stop Recording” button at the left of the screen. In
the window that opens in your web browser, click the “Copy Link” button, go to Outlook,
and paste that link into a blank e-mail.
3. Next, walk the participant through how to use the experimental task. To do this, again
share your screen with the student. Open “Medical Data Record Entry Task –
Researcher” file. Tell the student that they may have to click to “Enable Macros” just
underneath the top ribbon when they first open up the program. Then, enter in their
participant number and click the “Start” button. Now, read aloud the following script
while indicating the relevant areas on your screen:
The computer program will provide you with data corresponding to patients. You
should first look for the “Patient ID number” and type it into the correct location.
Then, look at whether the patient is male or female. You can determine that by
looking at the “Gender” box or by whether there is an “F” or “M” in the ID
number. Next, based on the ranges provided for the respective gender, determine
whether the patient’s data are “within range” or “outside of range” by clicking
the appropriate button. When you are satisfied with your response, click the
“submit” button to close the current patient’s record and generate the next
record. Let’s try one.”
Complete two records on your screen before continuing with the below script:
If you want to track your progress, you can click on the “Show Progress” button.
The window that opens will show you how many total records you have
completed, how many were correct, and how much time remains in the session. To
close the window, simply click the same button which now says “Hide Progress”.
Today, we would like for you to get comfortable with the task, so you will only
perform the task for five minutes. Future tasks will be 45 minutes each.
Close out of your Excel window and ask the participant to share their screen on WebEx.
Then, have them open Loom and the “Medical Data Record Entry Task – Introduction”
file on their computer. Next, have them begin recording their screen and camera using
Loom. Finally, have them start the experimental task and read the following script:
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The computer will keep a running total of the number of completed and correctly
completed records. The program keeps track of your performance. You may
minimize the data entry task, but under no circumstances should you close the
program or open any other Excel files. If you do, you will have to begin the
session over again. If you choose to take a break, feel free to browse the internet,
spend time on your cell phone, or play on your computer. Today, we’d like you to
practice the task for five minutes. After the five minutes have passed, the program
will automatically end and will prompt you to save the file. At that point, please
wait for my instructions. Please enter your participant number into the box and
click “Start” when you are ready.
Once the “Save As” dialogue box opens on the participant’s Excel window, walk them
through how to save the file and attach it to an e-mail addressed to
alejandro.ramos@wmich.edu. Also have them stop their Loom recording and copy-paste
the Loom link into that same e-mail. Once they have sent the e-mail, respond to any
questions they might have. After the participant feels comfortable with the procedures,
schedule their next session (or all six, if possible), explain that there will be no WebEx
meetings until after their final session (everything will be handled via e-mail from the
researcher’s end), and thank them for their time and participation.

91

Appendix G
Instructional Script for Pre-Experimental (Covariate) Session

92

PRE-EXPERIMENTAL (COVARIATE) SESSION SCRIPT (ALL GROUPS)
Send the following text in an e-mail to the participant, with the subject line “Medical Record
Data Entry Task – Session 1, Participant #[###]” (replacing [###] with the participant’s number),
and with the “Medical Record Data Entry Task – Session 1” Excel file attached to the e-mail.
Hello [Participant’s Name],
The medical record data entry task for your first session is attached to this e-mail. Please
read the following before you begin your session:
During this 45-minute session, please do your best to correctly complete as many records
as you can. We are assessing your keyboard proficiency on the task, which could affect
how you perform the task in the future. You will be paid $0.03 per correctly completed
record for this first session (for example, if you complete 100 records, you will earn
$3.00). We will pay you, in cash or by Venmo, at the end of the study for this session and
every following session that you attend. As a reminder, you may minimize the data entry
task, but under no circumstances should you close the program or open another Excel
file. If you do, you will have to begin the session over again.
The recording of your session may or may not be viewed afterward, and your
performance is monitored by the experimental task. After you start the medical entry task,
remember that you can always see how many records you have completed correctly by
clicking the “Show Progress” button. Once the 45 minutes are up and the task
automatically ends, please follow the instructions provided within the task window. Then,
attach the newly-saved task file to an e-mail addressed to alejandro.ramos@wmich.edu,
along with the link from Loom after you stop recording. Remember, for this session, it is
very important that you complete as many records as you can because we are assessing
your keyboard proficiency.
When you are ready, open Loom and begin recording both your screen and camera, then
open the medical record data entry task file attached to this e-mail and start the
experimental task.
Thank you for your participation,
[Your Name]
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PAY QUIZ SCRIPT (FIXED PAY GROUP)
Immediately after the participant has sent their e-mail with the items from their first session,
please send them the following text in a separate e-mail with the subject line “Medical Record
Data Entry Task – Pay Information”.
Hello [Participant’s Name],
During your previous session, you completed [###] correct records and will be receiving
$[#.##].
Before we begin your second session, I want to tell you how you will be paid for all of
your remaining sessions. Once you have read through this, I would like to make sure you
understand this by having you answer the “quiz” questions at the end of this e-mail. You
must answer them all correctly in order to pass, but I can ask you multiple versions of
these questions until you achieve that. If you don’t score 100% your first time, I will go
over the items you missed and explain to you why you missed them, after which you can
take another version of those same questions.
At the end of the study, which is six sessions long, you will be paid $9.30 for each 45minute session that you attend. In total, you would receive $46.50, plus the $[#.##] you
earned from the previous session, for a grand total of $[##.##] after attending all six
sessions. You have already attended one session, and your next session will be your
second.
There are also five goals which are simply performance targets for you to hit, each
progressively harder than the next. The goals have no bearing on your pay, but I
encourage you to meet them. The goals are 190, 250, 310, 360, and 410 correctly
completed records. With that being said, let’s have you take the quiz, now.
As a reminder, individuals are paid $9.30 for every session, regardless of how many
medical records they correctly process. Please answer the following questions based on
the pay system.
1. James correctly processed 225 medical records during a session. How much
money did James earn for that single session?
2. Michelle processed 429 medical records during a session, but only 368 were
correct. How much money did Michelle earn for that single session?
3. Jose correctly processed 485 medical records during a session. How much money
did Jose earn for that single session?
Please reply to this e-mail with your answers. If you have any questions, please feel free
to ask them in that e-mail, as well. I will respond back with your score on this quiz and
answer your questions you have. If you missed any items on the quiz, I will provide
feedback and give you new questions to answer.
Thank you for your time,
[Your Name]
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PAY QUIZ SCRIPT (PIECE-RATE PAY GROUP)
Immediately after the participant has sent their e-mail with the items from their first session,
please send them the following text in a separate e-mail with the subject line “Medical Record
Data Entry Task – Pay Information”.
Hello [Participant’s Name],
During your previous session, you completed [###] correct records and will be receiving
$[#.##].
Before we begin your second session, I want to tell you how you will be paid for all of
your remaining sessions. Once you have read through this, I would like to make sure you
understand this by having you answer the “quiz” questions at the end of this e-mail. You
must answer them all correctly in order to pass, but I can ask you multiple versions of
these questions until you achieve that. If you don’t score 100% your first time, I will go
over the items you missed and explain to you why you missed them, after which you can
take another version of those same questions.
At the end of the study, which is six sessions long, you will be paid $0.03 for each
medical record entry that you correctly complete. Thus, your pay is based on your
performance. For instance, if you were to correctly complete 400 records each session,
you would earn $12.00 each session and therefore a total of $60.00 for the remaining five
sessions, plus the $[#.##] from this previous session for a grand total of $[#.##] for the
study.
There are also five goals which are simply performance targets for you to hit, each
progressively harder than the next. The goals have no bearing on your pay, but I
encourage you to meet them. The goals are 190, 250, 310, 360, and 410 correctly
completed records. With that being said, let’s have you take the quiz, now.
As a reminder, individuals are paid 3 cents for every medical record correctly processed
during their sessions. Please answer the following questions based on the pay system.
1. James correctly processed 225 medical records during a session. How much
money did James earn for that single session?
2. Michelle processed 429 medical records during a session, but only 368 were
correct. How much money did Michelle earn for that single session?
3. Jose correctly processed 485 medical records during a session. How much money
did Jose earn for that single session?
Please reply to this e-mail with your answers. If you have any questions, please feel free
to ask them in that e-mail, as well. I will respond back with your score on this quiz and
answer your questions you have. If you missed any items on the quiz, I will provide
feedback and give you new questions to answer.
Thank you for your time,
[Your Name]
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PAY QUIZ SCRIPT (BONUS PAY GROUP)
Immediately after the participant has sent their e-mail with the items from their first session,
please send them the following text in a separate e-mail with the subject line “Medical Record
Data Entry Task – Pay Information”.
Hello [Participant’s Name],
During your previous session, you completed [###] correct records and will be receiving
$[#.##].
Before we begin your second session, I want to tell you how you will be paid for all of
your remaining sessions. Once you have read through this, I would like to make sure you
understand this by having you answer the “quiz” questions at the end of this e-mail. You
must answer them all correctly in order to pass, but I can ask you multiple versions of
these questions until you achieve that. If you don’t score 100% your first time, I will go
over the items you missed and explain to you why you missed them, after which you can
take another version of those same questions.
At the end of the study, which is six sessions long, you will be paid $4.80 for each 45minute session, plus $1.50 for each goal level you reach, up to $7.50 (for a total of
$12.30) for reaching the highest goal. Thus, your pay is partially based on your
performance. Each goal level is progressively harder than the next: they are 190, 250,
310, 360, and 410 correctly completed records.
So, for instance, if you were to correctly complete 400 records each session, you would
earn $4.80 + ($1.50 x 4) = $10.80 each session, and therefore a total of $54.00 for the
remaining five sessions. In this example, your grand total for the study would then be
$54.00 plus the $[#.##] from your previous session for a grand total of $[#.##]. With
that being said, let’s have you take the quiz, now.
As a reminder, individuals are paid $4.80 per session, plus $1.50 for each higher goal
level they reach. Please answer the following questions based on the pay system.
1. James correctly processed 225 medical records during a session. How much
money did James earn for that single session?
2. Michelle processed 429 medical records during a session, but only 368 were
correct. How much money did Michelle earn for that single session?
3. Jose correctly processed 485 medical records during a session. How much money
did Jose earn for that single session?
Please reply to this e-mail with your answers. If you have any questions, please feel free
to ask them in that e-mail, as well. I will respond back with your score on this quiz and
answer your questions you have. If you missed any items on the quiz, I will provide
feedback and give you new questions to answer.
Thank you for your time,
[Your Name]
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Appendix I
Quizzes for the Pay Systems
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FIXED PAY QUIZ #1
Individuals are paid $9.30 for each session, regardless of how many medical records they
correctly complete. Please answer the following questions based on the pay system.
1. James correctly processed 225 medical records during a session. How much money did
James earn for that single session?
ANSWER: $9.30
2. Michelle processed 429 medical records during a session, but only 368 were correct.
How much money did Michelle earn for that single session?
ANSWER: $9.30
3. Jose correctly processed 485 medical records during a session. How much money did
Jose earn for that single session?
ANSWER: $9.30
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FIXED PAY QUIZ #2
Individuals are paid $9.30 for each session, regardless of how many medical records they
correctly complete. Please answer the following questions based on the pay system.
1. Olivia correctly processed 427 medical records during a session. How much money did
Olivia earn for that single session?
ANSWER: $9.30
2. Nate processed 376 medical records during a session, but only 341 were correct. How
much money did Nate earn for that single session?
ANSWER: $9.30
3. Danielle correctly processed 250 medical records during a session. How much money did
Danielle earn for that single session?
ANSWER: $9.30
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PIECE-RATE PAY QUIZ #1
Individuals are paid 3 cents for every medical data record correctly processed during their
sessions. Please answer the following questions based on the pay system.
1. James correctly processed 225 medical records during a session. How much money did
James earn for that single session?
ANSWER: $6.75
2. Michelle processed 429 medical records during a session, but only 368 were correct.
How much money did Michelle earn for that single session?
ANSWER: $11.04
3. Jose correctly processed 485 medical records during a session. How much money did
Jose earn for that single session?
ANSWER: $14.55
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PIECE-RATE PAY QUIZ #2
Individuals are paid 3 cents for every medical data record correctly processed during their
sessions. Please answer the following questions based on the pay system.
1. Olivia correctly processed 427 medical records during a session. How much money did
Olivia earn for that single session?
ANSWER: $12.81
2. Nate processed 376 medical records during a session, but only 341 were correct. How
much money did Nate earn for that single session?
ANSWER: $10.23
3. Danielle correctly processed 250 medical records during a session. How much money did
Danielle earn for that single session?
ANSWER: $7.50
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BONUS PAY QUIZ #1
Individuals are paid $4.80 for each session plus $1.50 for each progressively higher goal level
they attain during that session. Please answer the following questions based on the pay system.
1. James correctly processed 225 medical records during a session. How much money did
James earn for that single session?
ANSWER: $6.30
2. Michelle processed 429 medical records during a session, but only 368 were correct.
How much money did Michelle earn for that single session?
ANSWER: $10.80
3. Jose correctly processed 485 medical records during a session. How much money did
Jose earn for that single session?
ANSWER: $12.30
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BONUS PAY QUIZ #2
Individuals are paid $4.80 for each session plus $1.50 for each progressively higher goal level
they attain during that session. Please answer the following questions based on the pay system.
1. Olivia correctly processed 427 medical records during a session. How much money did
Olivia earn for that single session?
ANSWER: $12.30
2. Nate processed 376 medical records during a session, but only 341 were correct. How
much money did Nate earn for that single session?
ANSWER: $9.30
3. Danielle correctly processed 250 medical records during a session. How much money did
Danielle earn for that single session?
ANSWER: $7.80
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Instructional Script for Experimental Sessions 1 – 5
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EXPERIMENTAL SESSION 1 SCRIPT (FIXED PAY GROUP)
Send the following text in an e-mail to the participant, with the subject line “Medical Record
Data Entry Task – Session 2, Participant #[###]” (replacing [###] with the participant’s number),
and with the “Medical Record Data Entry Task – Session 2” Excel file attached to the e-mail.
Hello [Participant’s Name],
During your previous session, you completed [###] correct records and will be receiving
$[#.##].
The medical record data entry task for your second session is attached to this e-mail.
Please read the following before you begin your session:
The goals for this session and all following sessions are below:
Level 1: Correctly complete 190 records
Level 2: Correctly complete 250 records
Level 3: Correctly complete 310 records
Level 4: Correctly complete 360 records
Level 5: Correctly complete 410 records
As a reminder, you may minimize the data entry task, but under no circumstances should
you close the program or open another Excel file. If you do, you will have to begin the
session over again.
The recording of your session may or may not be viewed afterward, and your
performance is monitored by the experimental task. After you start the medical entry task,
remember that you can always see how many records you have completed correctly by
clicking the “Show Progress” button. Once the 45 minutes are up and the task
automatically ends, please follow the instructions provided within the task window. Then,
attach the newly-saved task file to an e-mail addressed to alejandro.ramos@wmich.edu.
Also remember to share the link from Loom after you stop recording.
When you are ready, open Loom and begin recording both your screen and camera, then
open the medical record data entry task file attached to this e-mail and start the
experimental task.
Thank you for your participation,
[Your Name]
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EXPERIMENTAL SESSION 1 SCRIPT (PIECE-RATE PAY GROUP)
Send the following text in an e-mail to the participant, with the subject line “Medical Record
Data Entry Task – Session 2, Participant #[###]” (replacing [###] with the participant’s number),
and with the “Medical Record Data Entry Task – Session 2” Excel file attached to the e-mail.
Hello [Participant’s Name],
During your previous session, you completed [###] correct records and will be receiving
$[#.##].
The medical record data entry task for your second session is attached to this e-mail.
Please read the following before you begin your session:
The goals for this session and all following sessions are below:
Level 1: Correctly complete 190 records to earn $5.70
Level 2: Correctly complete 250 records to earn $7.50
Level 3: Correctly complete 310 records to earn $9.30
Level 4: Correctly complete 360 records to earn $10.80
Level 5: Correctly complete 410 records to earn $12.30
As a reminder, you may minimize the data entry task, but under no circumstances should
you close the program or open another Excel file. If you do, you will have to begin the
session over again.
The recording of your session may or may not be viewed afterward, and your
performance is monitored by the experimental task. After you start the medical entry task,
remember that you can always see how many records you have completed correctly by
clicking the “Show Progress” button. Once the 45 minutes are up and the task
automatically ends, please follow the instructions provided within the task window. Then,
attach the newly-saved task file to an e-mail addressed to alejandro.ramos@wmich.edu.
Also remember to share the link from Loom after you stop recording.
When you are ready, open Loom and begin recording both your screen and camera, then
open the medical record data entry task file attached to this e-mail and start the
experimental task.
Thank you for your participation,
[Your Name]

107

EXPERIMENTAL SESSION 1 SCRIPT (BONUS PAY GROUP)
Send the following text in an e-mail to the participant, with the subject line “Medical Record
Data Entry Task – Session 2, Participant #[###]” (replacing [###] with the participant’s number),
and with the “Medical Record Data Entry Task – Session 2” Excel file attached to the e-mail.
Hello [Participant’s Name],
During your previous session, you completed [###] correct records and will be receiving
$[#.##].
The medical record data entry task for your second session is attached to this e-mail.
Please read the following before you begin your session:
The goals for this session and all following sessions are below:
Level 1: Correctly complete 190 records to earn $6.30
Level 2: Correctly complete 250 records to earn $7.80
Level 3: Correctly complete 310 records to earn $9.30
Level 4: Correctly complete 360 records to earn $10.80
Level 5: Correctly complete 410 records to earn $12.30
As a reminder, you may minimize the data entry task, but under no circumstances should
you close the program or open another Excel file. If you do, you will have to begin the
session over again.
The recording of your session may or may not be viewed afterward, and your
performance is monitored by the experimental task. After you start the medical entry task,
remember that you can always see how many records you have completed correctly by
clicking the “Show Progress” button. Once the 45 minutes are up and the task
automatically ends, please follow the instructions provided within the task window. Then,
attach the newly-saved task file to an e-mail addressed to alejandro.ramos@wmich.edu.
Also remember to share the link from Loom after you stop recording.
When you are ready, open Loom and begin recording both your screen and camera, then
open the medical record data entry task file attached to this e-mail and start the
experimental task.
Thank you for your participation,
[Your Name]
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EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS 2 – 4 (FIXED PAY GROUP)
Send the following text in an e-mail to the participant, with the subject line “Medical Record
Data Entry Task – Session [3/4/5], Participant #[###]” (replacing [###] with the participant’s
number), and with the “Medical Record Data Entry Task – Session #” Excel file attached to the
e-mail.
Hello [Participant’s Name],
During your previous session, you completed [###] correct records and will be receiving
$[#.##] for that session, resulting in a total of $[##.##] for the study to date.
The medical record data entry task for your [third/fourth/fifth] session is attached to this
e-mail. Please read the following before you begin your session:
The goals for this session and all following sessions are below:
Level 1: Correctly complete 190 records
Level 2: Correctly complete 250 records
Level 3: Correctly complete 310 records
Level 4: Correctly complete 360 records
Level 5: Correctly complete 410 records
As a reminder, you may minimize the data entry task, but under no circumstances should
you close the program or open another Excel file. If you do, you will have to begin the
session over again.
The recording of your session may or may not be viewed afterward, and your
performance is monitored by the experimental task. After you start the medical entry task,
remember that you can always see how many records you have completed correctly by
clicking the “Show Progress” button. Once the 45 minutes are up and the task
automatically ends, please follow the instructions provided within the task window. Then,
attach the newly-saved task file to an e-mail addressed to alejandro.ramos@wmich.edu.
Also remember to share the link from Loom after you stop recording.
When you are ready, open Loom and begin recording both your screen and camera, then
open the medical record data entry task file attached to this e-mail and start the
experimental task.
Thank you for your participation,
[Your Name]

109

EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS 2 – 4 (PIECE-RATE PAY GROUP)
Send the following text in an e-mail to the participant, with the subject line “Medical Record
Data Entry Task – Session [3/4/5], Participant #[###]” (replacing [###] with the participant’s
number), and with the “Medical Record Data Entry Task – Session #” Excel file attached to the
e-mail.
Hello [Participant’s Name],
During your previous session, you completed [###] correct records and will be receiving
$[#.##] for that session, resulting in a total of $[##.##] for the study to date.
The medical record data entry task for your [third/fourth/fifth] session is attached to this
e-mail. Please read the following before you begin your session:
The goals for this session and all following sessions are below:
Level 1: Correctly complete 190 records to earn $5.70
Level 2: Correctly complete 250 records to earn $7.50
Level 3: Correctly complete 310 records to earn $9.30
Level 4: Correctly complete 360 records to earn $10.80
Level 5: Correctly complete 410 records to earn $12.30
As a reminder, you may minimize the data entry task, but under no circumstances should
you close the program or open another Excel file. If you do, you will have to begin the
session over again.
The recording of your session may or may not be viewed afterward, and your
performance is monitored by the experimental task. After you start the medical entry task,
remember that you can always see how many records you have completed correctly by
clicking the “Show Progress” button. Once the 45 minutes are up and the task
automatically ends, please follow the instructions provided within the task window. Then,
attach the newly-saved task file to an e-mail addressed to alejandro.ramos@wmich.edu.
Also remember to share the link from Loom after you stop recording.
When you are ready, open Loom and begin recording both your screen and camera, then
open the medical record data entry task file attached to this e-mail and start the
experimental task.
Thank you for your participation,
[Your Name]
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EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS 2 – 4 (BONUS PAY GROUP)
Send the following text in an e-mail to the participant, with the subject line “Medical Record
Data Entry Task – Session [3/4/5], Participant #[###]” (replacing [###] with the participant’s
number), and with the “Medical Record Data Entry Task – Session #” Excel file attached to the
e-mail.
Hello [Participant’s Name],
During your previous session, you completed [###] correct records and will be receiving
$[#.##] for that session, resulting in a total of $[##.##] for the study to date.
The medical record data entry task for your [third/fourth/fifth] session is attached to this
e-mail. Please read the following before you begin your session:
The goals for this session and all following sessions are below:
Level 1: Correctly complete 190 records to earn $6.30
Level 2: Correctly complete 250 records to earn $7.80
Level 3: Correctly complete 310 records to earn $9.30
Level 4: Correctly complete 360 records to earn $10.80
Level 5: Correctly complete 410 records to earn $12.30
As a reminder, you may minimize the data entry task, but under no circumstances should
you close the program or open another Excel file. If you do, you will have to begin the
session over again.
The recording of your session may or may not be viewed afterward, and your
performance is monitored by the experimental task. After you start the medical entry task,
remember that you can always see how many records you have completed correctly by
clicking the “Show Progress” button. Once the 45 minutes are up and the task
automatically ends, please follow the instructions provided within the task window. Then,
attach the newly-saved task file to an e-mail addressed to alejandro.ramos@wmich.edu.
Also remember to share the link from Loom after you stop recording.
When you are ready, open Loom and begin recording both your screen and camera, then
open the medical record data entry task file attached to this e-mail and start the
experimental task.
Thank you for your participation,
[Your Name]
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EXPERIMENTAL SESSION 5 (FINAL; FIXED PAY GROUP)
Send the following text in an e-mail to the participant, with the subject line “Medical Record
Data Entry Task – Final Session, Participant #[###]” (replacing [###] with the participant’s
number), and with the “Medical Record Data Entry Task – Session 6” Excel file attached to the
e-mail.
Hello [Participant’s Name],
This will be your final session. After you submit the items to the researcher via e-mail, the
researcher will be in contact with you to schedule the debriefing. During that meeting,
the researcher will provide you with information about the study, answer questions you
have, and provide you with your payment for participation.
During your previous session, you completed [###] correct records and will be receiving
$[#.##] for that session, resulting in a total of $[##.##] for the study to date.
The medical record data entry task for your final session is attached to this e-mail.
Please read the following before you begin your session:
The goals for this session and all following sessions are below:
Level 1: Correctly complete 190 records
Level 2: Correctly complete 250 records
Level 3: Correctly complete 310 records
Level 4: Correctly complete 360 records
Level 5: Correctly complete 410 records
As a reminder, you may minimize the data entry task, but under no circumstances should
you close the program or open another Excel file. If you do, you will have to begin the
session over again.
The recording of your session may or may not be viewed afterward, and your
performance is monitored by the experimental task. After you start the medical entry task,
remember that you can always see how many records you have completed correctly by
clicking the “Show Progress” button. Once the 45 minutes are up and the task
automatically ends, please follow the instructions provided within the task window. Then,
attach the newly-saved task file to an e-mail addressed to alejandro.ramos@wmich.edu.
Also remember to share the link from Loom after you stop recording.
When you are ready, open Loom and begin recording both your screen and camera, then
open the medical record data entry task file attached to this e-mail and start the
experimental task.
Thank you for your participation,
[Your Name]
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EXPERIMENTAL SESSION 5 (FINAL; PIECE-RATE PAY GROUP)
Send the following text in an e-mail to the participant, with the subject line “Medical Record
Data Entry Task – Final Session, Participant #[###]” (replacing [###] with the participant’s
number), and with the “Medical Record Data Entry Task – Session 6” Excel file attached to the
e-mail.
Hello [Participant’s Name],
This will be your final session. After you submit the items to the researcher via e-mail, the
researcher will be in contact with you to schedule the debriefing. During that meeting,
the researcher will provide you with information about the study, answer questions you
have, and provide you with your payment for participation.
During your previous session, you completed [###] correct records and will be receiving
$[#.##] for that session, resulting in a total of $[##.##] for the study to date.
The medical record data entry task for your final session is attached to this e-mail.
Please read the following before you begin your session:
The goals for this session and all following sessions are below:
Level 1: Correctly complete 190 records to earn $5.70
Level 2: Correctly complete 250 records to earn $7.50
Level 3: Correctly complete 310 records to earn $9.30
Level 4: Correctly complete 360 records to earn $10.80
Level 5: Correctly complete 410 records to earn $12.30
As a reminder, you may minimize the data entry task, but under no circumstances should
you close the program or open another Excel file. If you do, you will have to begin the
session over again.
The recording of your session may or may not be viewed afterward, and your
performance is monitored by the experimental task. After you start the medical entry task,
remember that you can always see how many records you have completed correctly by
clicking the “Show Progress” button. Once the 45 minutes are up and the task
automatically ends, please follow the instructions provided within the task window. Then,
attach the newly-saved task file to an e-mail addressed to alejandro.ramos@wmich.edu.
Also remember to share the link from Loom after you stop recording.
When you are ready, open Loom and begin recording both your screen and camera, then
open the medical record data entry task file attached to this e-mail and start the
experimental task.
Thank you for your participation,
[Your Name]
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EXPERIMENTAL SESSION 5 (FINAL; BONUS PAY GROUP)
Send the following text in an e-mail to the participant, with the subject line “Medical Record
Data Entry Task – Final Session, Participant #[###]” (replacing [###] with the participant’s
number), and with the “Medical Record Data Entry Task – Session 6” Excel file attached to the
e-mail.
Hello [Participant’s Name],
This will be your final session. After you submit the items to the researcher via e-mail, the
researcher will be in contact with you to schedule the debriefing. During that meeting,
the researcher will provide you with information about the study, answer questions you
have, and provide you with your payment for participation.
During your previous session, you completed [###] correct records and will be receiving
$[#.##] for that session, resulting in a total of $[##.##] for the study to date.
The medical record data entry task for your final session is attached to this e-mail.
Please read the following before you begin your session:
The goals for this session and all following sessions are below:
Level 1: Correctly complete 190 records to earn $6.30
Level 2: Correctly complete 250 records to earn $7.80
Level 3: Correctly complete 310 records to earn $9.30
Level 4: Correctly complete 360 records to earn $10.80
Level 5: Correctly complete 410 records to earn $12.30
As a reminder, you may minimize the data entry task, but under no circumstances should
you close the program or open another Excel file. If you do, you will have to begin the
session over again.
The recording of your session may or may not be viewed afterward, and your
performance is monitored by the experimental task. After you start the medical entry task,
remember that you can always see how many records you have completed correctly by
clicking the “Show Progress” button. Once the 45 minutes are up and the task
automatically ends, please follow the instructions provided within the task window. Then,
attach the newly-saved task file to an e-mail addressed to alejandro.ramos@wmich.edu.
Also remember to share the link from Loom after you stop recording.
When you are ready, open Loom and begin recording both your screen and camera, then
open the medical record data entry task file attached to this e-mail and start the
experimental task.
Thank you for your participation,
[Your Name]
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Appendix K
Stress/Satisfaction Questionnaire
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Appendix L
Debriefing Script
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DEBRIEFING SCRIPT
Forty-eight hours before meeting with the participant for their debriefing session, send them the
below text in an e-mail. Also send the participant a separate 30-minute WebEx meeting
invitation scheduled at the agreed-upon time for the debriefing session meeting.
Hello [Participant’s Name],
Thank you for your participation in our research study.
Before you meet with the researcher via WebEx for debriefing, please complete the stress
and satisfaction questionnaire by visiting the following link:
https://qfreeaccountssjc1.az1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_d1rqeX1Skwpv1yt
You will receive a separate e-mail for a WebEx meeting invitation scheduled for the time we
discussed. When that time comes, please click on the link within that e-mail to open up and
begin the meeting with me.
If you have any questions between now and then, please don’t hesitate to ask.
I look forward to meeting with you,
[Your Name]
At the start of your WebEx meeting with the participant, please ensure that they filled out the
Qualtrics stress and satisfaction questionnaire. Then, proceed with the following scripts and
steps.
“Thank you for participating in this study. Before I explain the purpose of the study, let’s
discuss your final receipt and pay. You completed six sessions and earned $##.##. How
would you like to be paid? We can pay you via Venmo, a cash transfer application, or by
cash directly. However, be aware that if you elect to paid in cash, we will have to
schedule a day and time to meet on campus to make the exchange.
If the participant elects Venmo, acquire their account name and perform the transfer, paying
them for the entire study. If they elect cash, then determine a time to meet with them on campus
and schedule it using the calendar and their WMU e-mail account, so that they, too, have the
meeting on their calendar. Then, continue with the following:
Do you have any questions about your performance during the study? [Answer any
questions.]
The purpose of this study was to compare the effects of fixed pay, piece-rate pay, and
bonus pay when individuals are given tiered performance goals. You were one of the
participants who received [fixed/piece-rate/bonus pay]. We allowed flexibility with how
you spent your time at the computer during the session because we believe that without
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interesting alternative things to do, individuals might work on the task the entire session,
regardless of how they are paid. Do you have any questions about the study? [Answer
any questions.]
Again, thank you for your participation. I really appreciate your continued participation
throughout the semester. Lastly, I ask that you please do not discuss this study with
anyone because we have not yet finished collecting data.
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